WinorDLL64: A backdoor from the vast Lazarus arsenal?

The targeted region, and overlap in behavior and code, suggest the tool is used by the infamous North Korea-aligned APT group

ESET researchers have discovered one of the payloads of the Wslink downloader that we uncovered back in 2021. We named this payload WinorDLL64 based on its filename WinorDLL64.dll. Wslink, which had the filename WinorLoaderDLL64.dll, is a loader for Windows binaries that, unlike other such loaders, runs as a server and executes received modules in memory. As the wording suggests, a loader serves as a tool to load a payload, or the actual malware, onto the already compromised system. The initial Wslink compromise vector has not been identified.

The initially unknown Wslink payload was uploaded to VirusTotal from South Korea shortly after the publication of our blogpost, and hit one of our YARA rules based on Wslink’s unique name WinorDLL64. Regarding Wslink, ESET telemetry has seen only a few detections – in Central Europe, North America, and the Middle East.

The WinorDLL64 payload serves as a backdoor that most notably acquires extensive system information, provides means for file manipulation, such as exfiltrating, overwriting, and removing files, and executes additional commands. Interestingly, it communicates over a connection that was already established by the Wslink loader.

In 2021, we did not find any data that would suggest Wslink is a tool from a known threat actor. However, after an extensive analysis of the payload, we have attributed WinorDLL64 to the Lazarus APT group with low confidence based on the targeted region and an overlap in both behavior and code with known Lazarus samples.

Active since at least 2009, this infamous North-Korea aligned group is responsible for high-profile incidents such as both the Sony Pictures Entertainment hack and tens-of-millions-of-dollar cyberheists in 2016, the WannaCryptor (aka WannaCry) outbreak in 2017, and a long history of disruptive attacks against South Korean public and critical infrastructure since at least 2011. US-CERT and the FBI call this group HIDDEN COBRA.

Based on our extensive knowledge of the activities and operations of this group, we believe that Lazarus consists of a large team that is systematically organized, well prepared, and is made up of several subgroups that utilize a large toolset. Last year, we discovered a Lazarus tool that took advantage of the CVE‑2021‑21551 vulnerability to target an employee of an aerospace company in the Netherlands, and a political journalist in Belgium. It was the first recorded abuse of the vulnerability; in combination, the tool and the vulnerability led to the blinding of the monitoring of all security solutions on compromised machines. We also provided an extensive description of the structure of the virtual machine used in samples of Wslink.

This blogpost explains the attribution of WinorDLL64 to Lazarus and provides an analysis of the payload.

Links to Lazarus

We have discovered overlaps in both behavior and code with Lazarus samples from Operation GhostSecret and the Bankshot implant described by McAfee. The description of the implants in both GhostSecret and Bankshot articles contains overlaps in the functionality with WinorDLL64 and we found some code overlap in the samples. In this blogpost we will only use the FE887FCAB66D7D7F79F05E0266C0649F0114BA7C sample from GhostSecret for comparison against WinorDLL64 (1BA443FDE984CEE85EBD4D4FA7EB1263A6F1257F), unless specified otherwise.

The following details summarize the supporting facts for our low confidence attribution to Lazarus:

1. Victimology

• Fellow researchers from AhnLab confirmed South Korean victims of Wslink in their telemetry, which is a relevant indicator considering the traditional Lazarus targets and that we have observed only a few hits.

2. Malware

• The latest GhostSecret sample reported by McAfee (FE887FCAB66D7D7F79F05E0266C0649F0114BA7C) is from February 2018; we spotted the first sample of Wslink in late 2018 and fellow researchers reported hits in August 2018, which they disclosed after our publication. Hence, these samples were spotted a relatively short period of time apart.
• The PE rich headers indicate that the same development environment and projects of similar size were used in several other known Lazarus samples (e.g., 70DE783E5D48C6FBB576BC494BAF0634BC304FD6; 8EC9219303953396E1CB7105CDB18ED6C568E962). We found this overlap using the following rules that cover only these Wslink and Lazarus samples, which is an indicator with a low weight. We tested them on VirusTotal’s retrohunt and our internal file corpus.

rich_signature.length == 80 and


pe.rich_signature.toolid(175, 30319) == 7 and


pe.rich_signature.toolid(155, 30319) == 1 and


pe.rich_signature.toolid(158, 30319) == 10 and


pe.rich_signature.toolid(170, 30319) >= 90 and


pe.rich_signature.toolid(170, 30319) <= 108

This rule can be translated to the following notation that is more readable and used by VirusTotal, where one can see the product version and build ID (VS2010 build 30319), number and type of source/object files used ([LTCG C++] where LTCG stands for Link Time Code Generation, [ASM], [ C ]), and number of exports ([EXP]) in the rule:

[LTCG C++] VS2010 build 30319 count=7


[EXP] VS2010 build 30319 count=1


[ASM] VS2010 build 30319 count=10


[ C ] VS2010 build 30319 count in [ 90 .. 108 ]

• The GhostSecret article described “a unique data-gathering and implant-installation component that listens on port 443 for inbound control server connections” that additionally ran as a service. This is an accurate description of Wslink downloader behavior, apart from the port number, which can vary based on the configuration. To sum it up, even though the implementation is different, both serve the same purpose.
• The loader is virtualized by Oreans’ Code Virtualizer, which is a commercial protector that is used frequently by Lazarus.
• The loader uses the MemoryModule library to load modules directly from memory. The library is not commonly used by malware, but it is quite popular among North Korea-aligned groups such as Lazarus and Kimsuky.
• Overlap in the code between WinorDLL64 and GhostSecret that we found during our analysis. The results and the significance in attribution are listed in Table 1.

Table 1. Similarities between WinorDLL64 and GhostSecret and their significance in attributing both to the same threat actor

Code overlap in the file sending functionality is highlighted in Figure 2 and Figure 3.

Technical analysis

WinorDLL64 serves as a backdoor that most notably acquires extensive system information, provides means for file manipulation, and executes additional commands. Interestingly, it communicates over a TCP connection that was already established by its loader and uses some of the loader’s functions.

The backdoor is a DLL with a single unnamed export that accepts one parameter – a structure for communication that was already described in our previous blogpost. The structure contains a TLS-context – socket, key, IV – and callbacks for sending and receiving messages encrypted with 256-bit AES-CBC that enable WinorDLL64 to exchange data securely with the operator over an already established connection.

The following facts lead us to believe with high confidence that the library is indeed part of Wslink:

• The unique structure is used everywhere in the expected way, e.g., the TLS-context and other meaningful parameters are supplied in the anticipated order to the correct callbacks.
• The name of the DLL is WinorDLL64.dll and Wslink’s name was WinorLoaderDLL64.dll.

WinorDLL64 accepts several commands. Figure 5 displays the loop that receives and handles commands. Each command is bound to a unique ID and accepts a configuration that contains additional parameters.

The command list, with our labels, is in Figure 6.

Table 2 contains a summary of the WinorDLL64 commands, where modified, and old categories refer to the relationship to the previously documented GhostSecret functionality. We highlight only significant changes in the modified category.

Table 2. Overview of backdoor commands

Conclusion

Wslink’s payload is dedicated to providing means for file manipulation, execution of further code, and obtaining extensive information about the underlying system that possibly can be leveraged later for lateral movement, due to specific interest in network sessions. The Wslink loader listens on a port specified in the configuration and can serve additional connecting clients, and even load various payloads.

WinorDLL64 contains an overlap in the development environment, behavior, and code with several Lazarus samples, which indicates that it might be a tool from the vast arsenal of this North-Korea aligned APT group.

IoCs

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

This table was built using version 12 of the ATT&CK framework. We do not mention techniques from the loader again, only the payload.