

Windows Malware Investigations

[no assembly required]

BLACK HILLS

Information Security



“We were targeted by a sophisticated,
advanced persistent threat.”

~Recently Breached Company [press release]

[for sale...“ocean front property” in Arizona]

“Most hackers suck.”

~A Reynolds [VP of IT]

[“You still want to buy our AI/ML, next-gen EDR...right?”]

Agenda/Schedule

[Session Length: 1 hour]

- Introduction
- Presuppositions & Context
- Investigative Workflow
- Technical Possibilities
- References/Contact
- Q&A



“it is futile to do with more things that which can be done with fewer”

~W Occam

Patterson Cake

DFIR Consultant


Win-Mal Investigations:

- Why? = ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE
- When? = Alert/Event Investigations
- Where?




[...horses not zebras...]

Malware Analysis



[“this is not a virtual machine...no, seriously”]

Malware Analysis




[“the world, as it is, is vexing enough”]

Malware Commonalities

- Initial Access (point of impact)
- Actions on Objective (do something)
- Network Communications (command and control)
- Evade detection (obfuscation, LOL, etc.)
- Persistence (survive a reboot)

[...horses not zebras...]



Most Common Threats (Recent)

- Qbot
- SocGh0lish
- Raspberry Robin
- Gootloader
- Spongy Weasel
- Yellow Cockatoo

“Red Canary – Intelligence Insights & Threat Intelligence Reports”

Malware Commonalities

- **Initial Access:** SEO Poisoning, Malvertising, Drive-By's
 - File Types: .zip, .rar, .iso, .vhd, .lnk, .msi
- **Actions on Objective:** staging & initial enumeration
 - Execution: wsript, cscript, powershell, cmd, rundll32
- **Network Communications:** outbound tcp/https
- **Evade detection:** LOLBINS, disable endpoint protections
- **Persistence:** scheduled tasks, registry, startup folder

[defenders must be right 100% of the time...attackers only once]

[memory]

Name	Private Bytes	Working Set	Session Name	Architecture	Company Name	Description	Image Name	MD5 Hash	Parent Process Name	Process ID	Session ID	Start Time	Status	System	Working Set	Private Bytes	Command Line	
AggregatorHost.exe																		
amazon-ssm-agent.exe																		
conhost.exe																		
conhost.exe																		
cscript.exe										1268			Running	SYSTEM			"C:\Windows\System32\cscript.exe" "MOBILE~1.JS"	
csrss.exe										516			Running	SYSTEM				
csrss.exe										10716			Running	SYSTEM				

[identity]

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
langs.xml	11/15/2023 9:41 AM	XML File	452 KB
Mobile Networking.js	1/5/2024 7:02 AM	JSFile	39,957 KB

Name	Status	Triggers
Foundation Shade Matching	Ready	At log on of COMPADVISORS\wbailey


Action	Details
Start a program	wscript MOBILE~1.JS

[disk]

Name	Private Bytes	Working Set	Session Name	Image Name	Command Line
NisSrv.exe	2120	Running	LOCAL SERVICE		
OneDrive.exe	4676	Running	itadmin		"C:\Users\itadmin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\OneDrive.exe"
powershell.exe	1156	Running	itadmin		pOWerShell.ExE
rdpclip.exe	1072	Running	itadmin		rdpclip
Registry	88	Running	SYSTEM		

```
PS C:\Users\itadmin> netstat -ano | findstr /i "4456"
TCP 172.31.47.48:56308 89.42.211.237:443 ESTABLISHED 4456
PS C:\Users\itadmin> netstat -ano | findstr /i "4456"
TCP 172.31.47.48:56308 89.42.211.237:443 ESTABLISHED 4456
PS C:\Users\itadmin> netstat -ano | findstr /i "4456"
TCP 172.31.47.48:56308 89.42.211.237:443 ESTABLISHED 4456
```

[network]



Technical Possibilities...

- PowerShell One-Liners [EDR?]
- PowerShell One-Liners w/Excel Diff
- Velociraptor Offline [parsed]*
- Velociraptor Offline w/Excel Diff*

*[small but mighty...and easy to transfer]

Windows Malware Investigation - Artifacts

- **Select Artifacts {actionable intelligence!}**
 - Network Connections (netstat, dns)
 - Disk (MFT)
 - Running Processes (pslist)
 - Persistence (services, tasks, startup items)

[collect...parse...reduce/refine]

Network Communications (C2) *

[gootloader]

```
oc.php","https://tv[REDACTED].tr/xmlrpc.php","https://bukhara-  
php") | Get-Random)cATCH{};Sleep -S 20}
```

```
$timespan = New-TimeSpan -Minutes 1  
$timer = [diagnostics.stopwatch]::startnew()  
while ($timer.elapsed -lt $timespan){  
$gettcpconnections = Get-NetTCPConnection | Where-Object state -ne "Bound" |  
Select-Object localaddress,localport,remoteaddress,remoteport,state,owningprocess,  
@{Name="process";Expression={(Get-Process -id $_.OwningProcess).ProcessName}} |  
Export-Csv c:\users\security\Desktop\net-connect.csv -NoTypeInfoation -Append  
$gettcpconnections  
start-sleep -seconds 3
```

[See <https://github.com/secure-cake/win-mal-investigations/misc-powershell>]

Disk (“Writable”)*

Directory: **C:\ProgramData**

Mode	LastWriteTime	Length	Name
d----	11/15/2023 5:52 PM		Microsoft OneDrive
d----	11/15/2023 6:30 PM		Microsoft Visual Studio
d----	5/7/2022 5:24 AM		USOShared
d----	11/15/2023 7:12 PM		VMware

Directory: **C:\Users**

Mode	LastWriteTime	Length	Name
d----	2/2/2024 9:45 PM		Security

%userprofile%\appdata\..

```
Get-ChildItem -Directory -Recurse -Depth 1 -Force C:\ -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |`
where {(get-acl $_.fullname).access | where {($_.identityreference -eq 'rtw-win11-02022\security')`
-or ($_identityreference -eq 'nt authority\authenticated users') -or`
($_identityreference -eq 'builtin\users') -or ($_identityreference -eq 'rtw-win11-02022\Users')`
-and ($_filesystemrights -eq 'FullControl') -or ($_filesystemrights -eq 'Modify')`
-or ($_filesystemrights -eq 'Write')}}`
```

[See <https://github.com/secure-cake/win-mal-investigations/misc-powershell>]

Running Processes (Memory)

```
name      : services.exe
executablepath :
processid : 748
parentprocessid : 628
commandline :

name      : lsass.exe
executablepath : C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe
processid : 796
parentprocessid : 628
commandline : C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe
```

Pid	Ppid	Name	CommandLine	Exe
4456	11936	powershell.exe	pOWeRshell.ExE	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

```
Get-Wmiobject win32_process | select name,executablepath,processid,parentprocessid,commandline |
export-csv c:\users\security\desktop\pslist.csv -NoTypeInfoation
```

[See <https://github.com/secure-cake/win-mal-investigations/misc-powershell>]

Services

Name	State	DisplayName	ProcessId	StartMode	PathName
AJRouter	Stopped	AllJoyn Router Service	0	Manual	C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k Local
ALG	Stopped	Application Layer Gateway Service	0	Manual	C:\Windows\System32\alg.exe
AppIDSvc	Stopped	Application Identity	0	Manual	C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k Local

```
get-wmiobject win32_service | select name, state, displayname, processid, startmode, pathname, startname |`  
export-csv c:\users\security\desktop\target-services.csv -NoTypeInfo
```

[See <https://github.com/secure-cake/win-mal-investigations/misc-powershell>]

Scheduled Tasks

HostName	TaskName	Author	Task To Run
RTW-WIN11-02022	\MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskMachineCore	N/A	C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe /c
RTW-WIN11-02022	\MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskMachineCore	N/A	C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe /c

```
schtasks /query /V /FO csv | convertfrom-csv | where taskname -ne "TaskName" |`  
select hostname,taskname,'next run time',status,'logon mode','last run time',`  
author,'task to run','start in',comment,'scheduled task state','run as user' |`  
export-csv c:\users\security\desktop\baseline-tasks.csv -NoTypeInformation
```

[See <https://github.com/secure-cake/win-mal-investigations/misc-powershell>]

Running Processes [DIFF]

Pid	Ppid	Name	CommandLine	Exe
3496	728	vm3dservice.exe	C:\Windows\System32\vm3dservice.exe	C:\Windows\System32\vm3dservice.exe
3520	728	wlms.exe	C:\Windows\System32\wlms\wlms.exe	C:\Windows\System32\wlms\wlms.exe
3528	728	Sysmon64.exe	C:\Windows\Sysmon64.exe	C:\Windows\Sysmon64.exe
3544	728	svchost.exe	C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService	C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
3732	728	svchost.exe	C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SharedAccess	C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
2396	856	unsecapp.exe	C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding	C:\Windows\System32\wbem\unsecapp.exe
4668	3336	AggregatorHost.exe	AggregatorHost.exe	C:\Windows\System32\AggregatorHost.exe
4372	728	svchost.exe	C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc	C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe

Green = Match
Yellow = Unique


Target Baseline

Conditional Formatting Rules Manager

Show formatting rules for: This Worksheet

New Rule... Edit Rule... Delete Rule Duplicate Rule

Rule (applied in order shown)	Format	Applies to
Formula: =COUNTIF(Baseline!\$D\$1:\$D\$250,D1)=0	AaBbCcYyZz	=SD:SD
Formula: =COUNTIF(Baseline!\$D\$1:\$D\$250,D1)>0	AaBbCcYyZz	=SD:SD



Windows Malware Investigation - Artifacts

- **Select Artifacts {actionable intelligence!}**
 - Network Connections (netstat, dns)
 - Disk (MFT)
 - Running Processes (pslist)
 - Persistence (services, tasks, startup items)

[collect...parse...reduce/refine]



Windows Malware Investigation Collection

- Velociraptor Offline Collector

- Artifacts

- KAPE [MFT, AV Logs, PowerShell Console/Transcripts]
 - Netstat Enriched
 - DNS Cache
 - Services
 - TaskScheduler (w/upload)
 - StartupItems
 - PSList

[See <https://github.com/secure-cake/win-mal-investigations>]



Win-Mal Investigation - WORKFLOW

- Create “win-mal” Velociraptor Collector*
- Distribute/execute “win-mal” collector on “baseline” system*
- Distribute/execute “win-mal” collector on “target” system
- Stage “win-mal” data on analysis system
- Run “WinMal_Target_Baseline_Excel.ps1” script
- Open Excel combined workbook
- Create Excel “automations”*
- Review “unique” artifacts from “target” system

[See <https://github.com/secure-cake/win-mal-investigations>]

Sandbox Analysis #1 [FINDINGS]

IOCs ✕

Summary of indicators of compromises 4


Copy selected

Main object – Early_decision_agreement_common_app_69286.zip ▲

? MD5	23a708284c6dc7b8f4064b93ec21d9bc
? SHA1	7c4d08209ce936cf79cfa25f46dbe75519cb67c5
? SHA256	a903f89bdacbbca4ae1a8708968b4f5fc0f15a1211a5dcca0fb7afd0e0f2c70c

Connections (1) ▲

? IP	224.0.0.252
------	-------------




[224.0.0.252?]

Sandbox Analysis #2 [FINDINGS]

Last update: 02/13/2024 14:39:20 (UTC)

Huorong	✓	Bitdefender	✓
Avira	✓	Zillya!	✓
Sophos	✗ Troj/DrodZp-CL	Vir.IT eXplorer	✓
VirusBlokAda	✓	K7	✓
McAfee	✓	NETGATE	✓
TACHYON	✓	Varist	✓
Kaspersky	✓	Antiy	✓
AhnLab	✓	Lionic	✓
Webroot SMD	✓	Emsisoft	✓
NANOAV	✓	RocketCyber	✓
Comodo	✓	ESET	✓
ClamAV	✓	Cylance	✓




Indicators = encoded JavaScript

[“malicious”]

Win-Mal Investigations [FINDINGS]

- Netstat: x1 IP [suspicious]
- Pslist: x1 process [malicious]
- Services: x0
- Startup: x0
- Tasks: x1 task [malicious]
- DNS: x4 A Record [malicious/suspicious]

x7 IOC's - "malware is not magic" ~Cake



WinMal Technical Possibilities...

- Collect:
 - PowerShell
 - EDR
 - Velociraptor
 - Other...
- Parse (Process):
 - Excel (Automate)
 - OpenOffice Calc
- Reduce/Refine:
 - Diff w/baseline (Excel)

[See <https://github.com/secure-cake/win-mal-investigations>]

Q&A

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Thank you!

Point of Impact



Attack
Extents



Attack Surface

Detection → Analysis → Containment → Eradication → Recovery

Attack Surface → Indicators → Capabilities

Point of
Impact

[application]
[identity]
[endpoint]
[network]
[third party]
[other]

[memory]
[identity]
[network]
[disk]

[EDR]
[Antivirus]
[Proxy]
[SIEM]
[Firewalls]
[Azure/M365]
[OS Tools]
[...]

Visibility &
Containment

[frameworks: broadly-applicable guidelines upon which to build something useful]