

NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 1800-28

Data Confidentiality: Identifying and Protecting Assets Against Data Breaches

Includes Executive Summary (A); Approach, Architecture, and Security Characteristics (B);
and How-To Guides (C)

William Fisher
R. Eugene Craft
Michael Ekstrom
Julian Sexton
John Sweetnam

December 2023

DRAFT

This publication is available free of charge from
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*National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence
NIST*

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*The MITRE Corporation
McLean, Virginia*

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U.S. Department of Commerce
Gina M. Raimondo, Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology
Laurie E. Locascio, NIST Director and Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology

NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 1800-28A

Data Confidentiality:

Identifying and Protecting Assets Against Data Breaches

Volume A:
Executive Summary

William Fisher

National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence
NIST

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1 Executive Summary

2 CHALLENGE

3 In our data-driven world, organizations must prioritize cybersecurity as part of their business risk
4 management strategy. Specifically, data security remains a challenge as attacks against an organization’s
5 data can compromise emails, employee records, financial records, and customer information thereby
6 impacting business operations, revenue, and reputation. In the event of a data breach, data
7 confidentiality can be compromised via unauthorized exfiltration, leaking, or spills of data or corporate
8 information to unauthorized parties, including the general public. This can be intentional or accidental.

9 In the event of an ongoing data breach, it is essential that an organization be able to detect the ongoing
10 breach themselves, as well as begin to execute a response and recovery plan that leverages security
11 technology and controls.

12 BENEFITS


13 The National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) at the National Institute of Standards and
14 Technology (NIST) developed this guide to help organizations implement strategies for preventing
15 recovering from data confidentiality attacks. This NIST NCCoE Cybersecurity Practice Guide
16 demonstrates how organizations can develop and implement appropriate actions to identify and protect
17 data against a confidentiality cybersecurity event. It includes numerous technology and security
18 recommendations to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture.

This practice guide can help your organization:

- Identify data on your network that is vulnerable to a data breach
- Identify vulnerabilities to data breaches on your network
- Implement protective technologies to prevent data breaches

19 APPROACH


20 This is part of a series of projects that seek to provide guidance
21 to improve an organization’s data security in the context of the
22 CIA triad. The CIA triad represents the three pillars of
23 information security: confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
24 This practice guide focuses on **data confidentiality**: the
25 property that data has not been disclosed in an unauthorized
26 fashion. Data confidentiality concerns data in storage, during
27 processing, and while in transit. (Note: These definitions are
28 from National Institute of Standards and Technology ([NIST](#))
29 [Special Publication \(SP\) 800-12 Rev 1, An Introduction to](#)
30 [Information Security](#).)



32

31
33

34 This guide applies data confidentiality principles through the
 35 lens of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework version 1.1.
 36 Specifically, this practice guide informs organizations of how to
 37 **identify** and **protect** assets, including data, against a data
 38 confidentiality attack, and in turn understand how to manage
 39 data confidentiality risks and implement the appropriate
 40 safeguards. A complementary project and accompanying
 41 practice guide (SP1800-29) addresses data confidentiality
 42 through the lens of detecting, responding, and recovering from
 43 a data confidentiality attack.



45

44
 46 The NCCoE developed and implemented a solution that incorporates multiple systems working in
 47 concert to identify and protect assets and data against detected data confidentiality cybersecurity
 48 events. The solution will demonstrate the ability to identify assets and data that are at risk of a data
 49 breach and recommend capabilities to help protect them.

50 In developing this solution, the NCCoE sought existing technologies that provided the following
 51 capabilities:

- 52 ▪ **Logging**
- 53 ▪ **Network protection**
- 54 ▪ **User access control**
- 55 ▪ **Data management**
- 56 ▪ **Data protection**
- 57 ▪ **Policy enforcement**
- 58 ▪ **Browser isolation**

Collaborator	Security Capability or Component
Avrio Software (now known as Aerstone)	Data Management
Cisco	Policy Enforcement, User Access Control
Dispel	Network Protection
FireEye	Logging
PKWARE	Data Protection
Qcor	Data Protection
Strongkey	Data Protection
Symantec, a Division of Broadcom	Browser Isolation

59 While the NCCoE used a suite of commercial products to address this challenge, this guide does not
 60 endorse these particular products, nor does it guarantee compliance with any regulatory initiatives. Your
 61 organization's information security experts should identify the products that will best integrate with
 62 your existing tools and IT system infrastructure. Your organization can adopt this solution or one that

63 adheres to these guidelines in whole, or you can use this guide as a starting point for tailoring and
64 implementing parts of a solution.

65 HOW TO USE THIS GUIDE

66 Depending on your role in your organization, you might use this guide in different ways:

67 **Business decision makers, including chief information security and technology officers** can use this
68 part of the guide, *NIST SP 1800-28a: Executive Summary*, to understand the drivers for the guide, the
69 cybersecurity challenge we address, our approach to solving this challenge, and how the solution could
70 benefit your organization.

71 **Technology, security, and privacy program managers** who are concerned with how to identify,
72 understand, assess, and mitigate risk can use *NIST SP 1800-28b: Approach, Architecture, and Security*
73 *Characteristics*, which describes what we built and why, including the risk analysis performed and the
74 security/privacy control mappings.

75 **IT professionals** who want to implement an approach like this can make use of *NIST SP 1800-28c: How-*
76 *To Guides*, which provide specific product installation, configuration, and integration instructions for
77 building the example implementation, allowing you to replicate all or parts of this project.

78 SHARE YOUR FEEDBACK

79 You can view or download the guide at [https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/building-blocks/data-](https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/building-blocks/data-security/dc-detect-identify-protect)
80 [security/dc-detect-identify-protect](https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/building-blocks/data-security/dc-detect-identify-protect). Help the NCCoE make this guide better by sharing your thoughts
81 with us as you read the guide. If you adopt this solution for your own organization, please share your
82 experience and advice with us. We recognize that technical solutions alone will not fully enable the
83 benefits of our solution, so we encourage organizations to share lessons learned and best practices for
84 transforming the processes associated with implementing this guide.

85 To provide comments or to learn more by arranging a demonstration of this example implementation,
86 contact the NCCoE at ds-nccoe@nist.gov.

87

88 COLLABORATORS

89 Collaborators participating in this project submitted their capabilities in response to an open call in the
90 Federal Register for all sources of relevant security capabilities from academia and industry (vendors
91 and integrators). Those respondents with relevant capabilities or product components signed a
92 Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) to collaborate with NIST in a consortium to
93 build this example solution.

94 Certain commercial entities, equipment, products, or materials may be identified by name or company
95 logo or other insignia in order to acknowledge their participation in this collaboration or to describe an
96 experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply special
97 status or relationship with NIST or recommendation or endorsement by NIST or NCCoE; neither is it
98 intended to imply that the entities, equipment, products, or materials are necessarily the best available
99 for the purpose.

Data Confidentiality:

Identifying and Protecting Assets Against Data Breaches

Volume B:
Approach, Architecture, and Security Characteristics

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1 **DISCLAIMER**

2 Certain commercial entities, equipment, products, or materials may be identified by name or company
3 logo or other insignia in order to acknowledge their participation in this collaboration or to describe an
4 experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply special
5 status or relationship with NIST or recommendation or endorsement by NIST or NCCoE; neither is it
6 intended to imply that the entities, equipment, products, or materials are necessarily the best available
7 for the purpose.

8

9 National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 1800-28B, Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol.
10 Spec. Publ. 1800-28B, 61 pages, (December 2023), CODEN: NSPUE2

11 **FEEDBACK**

12 You can improve this guide by contributing feedback. As you review and adopt this solution for your
13 own organization, we ask you and your colleagues to share your experience and advice with us.

14 Comments on this publication may be submitted to: ds-nccoe@nist.gov

15 Public comment period: December 13, 2023 through January 15, 2024

16 All comments are subject to release under the Freedom of Information Act.

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19 100 Bureau Drive
20 Mailstop 2002
21 Gaithersburg, MD 20899
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23 **NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE**

24 The National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE), a part of the National Institute of Standards
25 and Technology (NIST), is a collaborative hub where industry organizations, government agencies, and
26 academic institutions work together to address businesses' most pressing cybersecurity issues. This
27 public-private partnership enables the creation of practical cybersecurity solutions for specific
28 industries, as well as for broad, cross-sector technology challenges. Through consortia under
29 Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs), including technology partners—from
30 Fortune 50 market leaders to smaller companies specializing in information technology security—the
31 NCCoE applies standards and best practices to develop modular, adaptable example cybersecurity
32 solutions using commercially available technology. The NCCoE documents these example solutions in
33 the NIST Special Publication 1800 series, which maps capabilities to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework
34 and details the steps needed for another entity to re-create the example solution. The NCCoE was
35 established in 2012 by NIST in partnership with the State of Maryland and Montgomery County,
36 Maryland.

37 To learn more about the NCCoE, visit <https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/>. To learn more about NIST, visit
38 <https://www.nist.gov/>.

39 **NIST CYBERSECURITY PRACTICE GUIDES**

40 NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guides (Special Publication 1800 series) target specific cybersecurity
41 challenges in the public and private sectors. They are practical, user-friendly guides that facilitate the
42 adoption of standards-based approaches to cybersecurity. They show members of the information
43 security community how to implement example solutions that help them align with relevant standards
44 and best practices, and provide users with the materials lists, configuration files, and other information
45 they need to implement a similar approach.

46 The documents in this series describe example implementations of cybersecurity practices that
47 businesses and other organizations may voluntarily adopt. These documents do not describe regulations
48 or mandatory practices, nor do they carry statutory authority.

49 **ABSTRACT**

50 Attacks that target data are of concern to companies and organizations across many industries. Data
51 breaches represent a threat that can have monetary, reputational, and legal impacts. This guide seeks to
52 provide guidance concerning the threat of data breaches, exemplifying standards and technologies that
53 are useful for a variety of organizations defending against this threat. Specifically, this guide seeks to
54 help organizations identify and protect assets, including data, against a data confidentiality attack.

55 **KEYWORDS**

56 asset management; cybersecurity framework; data breach; data confidentiality; data protection;
57 identify; malicious actor; malware; protect; ransomware

58 **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

59 We are grateful to the following individuals for their generous contributions of expertise and time.

Name	Organization
Jason Winder	Avrio Software (now known as Aerstone)
Trey Doré	Cisco
Matthew Hyatt	Cisco
Randy Martin	Cisco
Peter Romness	Cisco
Bryan Rosensteel	Cisco
Micah Wilson	Cisco
Ben Burke	Dispel
Fred Chang	Dispel
Matt Fulk	Dispel
Ian Schmertzler	Dispel
Kenneth Durbin	FireEye
Tom Los	FireEye
J.R. Wikes	FireEye
Jennifer Cawthra	NIST
Joe Faxlanger	PKWARE
Victor Ortiz	PKWARE
Jim Wyne	PKWARE

Name	Organization
Steve Petruzzo	Qcor
Billy Stewart	Qcor
Norman Field	StrongKey
Patrick Leung	StrongKey
Arshad Noor	StrongKey
Dylan Buel	Broadcom Software
Sunjeet Randhawa	Broadcom Software
Paul Swinton	Broadcom Software
Spike Dog	The MITRE Corporation
Sallie Edwards	The MITRE Corporation
Brian Johnson	The MITRE Corporation
Lauren Lusty	The MITRE Corporation
Karri Meldorf	The MITRE Corporation
Julie Snyder	The MITRE Corporation
Lauren Swan	The MITRE Corporation
Anne Townsend	The MITRE Corporation
Jessica Walton	The MITRE Corporation

60 The Technology Partners/Collaborators who participated in this build submitted their capabilities in
61 response to a notice in the Federal Register. Respondents with relevant capabilities or product

62 components were invited to sign a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) with
 63 NIST, allowing them to participate in a consortium to build this example solution. We worked with:

Technology Partner/Collaborator	Build Involvement
Avrio Software (now known as Aerstone)	Avrio SIFT
Cisco Systems	Duo
Dispel	Dispel
FireEye	FireEye Helix
Qcor	Qcor ForceField
PKWARE	PKWARE PKProtect
StrongKey	StrongKey Tellaro
Symantec, a Division of Broadcom	Symantec Web Isolation

64 DOCUMENT CONVENTIONS

65 The terms “shall” and “shall not” indicate requirements to be followed strictly to conform to the
 66 publication and from which no deviation is permitted. The terms “should” and “should not” indicate that
 67 among several possibilities, one is recommended as particularly suitable without mentioning or
 68 excluding others, or that a certain course of action is preferred but not necessarily required, or that (in
 69 the negative form) a certain possibility or course of action is discouraged but not prohibited. The terms
 70 “may” and “need not” indicate a course of action permissible within the limits of the publication. The
 71 terms “can” and “cannot” indicate a possibility and capability, whether material, physical, or causal.

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 76 or by reference to another publication. This call also includes disclosure, where known, of the existence
 77 of pending U.S. or foreign patent applications relating to this ITL draft publication and of any relevant
 78 unexpired U.S. or foreign patents.

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87 or

88 2. without compensation and under reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free
89 of any unfair discrimination.

90 Such assurance shall indicate that the patent holder (or third party authorized to make assurances on its
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92 provisions sufficient to ensure that the commitments in the assurance are binding on the transferee,
93 and that the transferee will similarly include appropriate provisions in the event of future transfers with
94 the goal of binding each successor-in-interest.

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96 whether such provisions are included in the relevant transfer documents.

97 Such statements should be addressed to: ds-nccoe@nist.gov.

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154 **1 Summary**

155 In our data-driven world, organizations must prioritize cybersecurity and privacy as part of their business
 156 risk management strategy. Specifically, data confidentiality remains a challenge as attacks against an
 157 organization’s data can compromise emails, employee records, financial records, and customer
 158 information—impacting business operations, revenue, and reputation.

159 Confidentiality is officially defined as “preserving authorized restrictions on information access and
 160 disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information”[1]. Data
 161 confidentiality makes sure that only the right people have access to the right data. Ensuring data
 162 confidentiality should be a priority for any organization regardless of industry. A loss of data
 163 confidentiality can be of great impact to not just the company or organization, but also to the individuals
 164 who have trusted the organization with their data.

165 The National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) at the National Institute of Standards and
 166 Technology (NIST) developed an example solution to address data security and privacy needs. This
 167 project fits within a larger series of Data Security projects that are organized by the elements of the
 168 Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability (CIA) triad, and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework’s (CSF) Core
 169 Functions: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover.



Note: This project was initiated before the release of the DRAFT NIST CSF 2.0 and thus does not include the newly added GOVERN function. The DRAFT NIST CSF 2.0 defines Govern as “Establish and monitor the organization’s cybersecurity risk management strategy, expectations, and policy”. The govern function cuts across the other CSF functions. Though this document focuses on technical capabilities, it’s intended that those capabilities would support an organizational governance function in managing data confidentiality attack risk.

170 **Figure 1-1 Data Security Project Mapping**

Cybersecurity Framework Functions	Information Security Goals		
	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability
Identify	1800-28 (you are here)	1800-25	
Protect			
Detect		1800-26	
Respond	1800-29		
Recover		1800-11	

171 The goals of this NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide are to assist organizations in identifying and
172 protecting their assets and data in order to prepare for and prevent a data confidentiality event. This
173 guide will help organizations:

- 174 • Inventory data storage and data flows
- 175 • Protect against confidentiality attacks against hosts, the network and enterprise components
- 176 • Protect enterprise data at rest, in transit, and in use
- 177 • Configure logging and audit capabilities to meet organizational requirements
- 178 • Provide user access controls to sensitive data
- 179 • Provide user authentication mechanisms for host and network access
- 180 • Enumerate data flows and problematic data actions in line with the NIST privacy framework

181 In addition to the guidance provided in these documents, NIST has many resources available to help
182 organizations to identify and protect data:

- 183 • NIST Special Publication 1800-25, Data Integrity: Identifying and Protecting Assets Against
184 Ransomware and other Destructive Events [2]
- 185 • NIST Special Publication 800-83, Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling for Desktops
186 and Laptops [5]
- 187 • NIST Special Publication 800-46, Guide to Enterprise Telework, Remote Access, and Bring Your Own
188 Device (BYOD) Security [6]
- 189 • NIST Privacy Framework [7]
- 190 • NIST Cybersecurity Framework [8]
- 191 • NIST Interagency Report 8374, Ransomware Risk Management: A Cybersecurity Framework Profile
192 [9]
- 193 • NIST Special Publication 800-160, Developing Cyber-Resilient Systems: A Systems Security
194 Engineering Approach [10]

195 **1.1 Challenge**

196 Fundamentally, data confidentiality is a challenge because all data exists to be accessible by some
197 number of authorized people or systems. Data access only becomes a data breach when that access is
198 by an unauthorized person or system. The quantity and diversity of an organization’s data, the varying
199 methods of data access (on-site versus remote, computer versus mobile device) and the potential for
200 the compromise of valid user credentials all challenge an organization’s ability to maintain the
201 confidentiality of their data. NIST SP 1800-28 focuses on the Identify and Protect Functions of the NIST
202 Cybersecurity Framework and addresses the challenges related to categorizing authorized and
203 unauthorized data access. Once that ontology is developed, this document helps organizations address
204 identifying potential breaches of data confidentiality as well as protecting against the resulting losses.

205 Additional challenges arise when defining what it means to “identify” or “protect” data. In the NCCoE’s
206 previous work on Data Integrity (1800-25[2], 1800-26[3], and 1800-11[4]), it was possible to define
207 recovery as a rollback of the compromised data to a point in time before it was altered. With respect to
208 a loss of data confidentiality, there is no such process by which to “undo” the effects of such a loss—
209 once digital data is in the hands of an unauthorized user, there is no guaranteed method by which to get
210 all copies of the data back. This leaves an organization and the affected individuals with non-technical

211 mitigations for the consequences of the breach (financial, reputational, etc.), as well as the ability of the
212 organization to apply the lessons learned to technical improvements earlier in the timeline to prevent
213 against future breaches.

214 1.2 Solution

215 The NCCoE developed this two-part solution to address considerations for both data security and data
216 privacy to help organizations manage the risk of a data confidentiality attack. The work in 1800-29
217 addresses an organization’s actions during and after a loss of data confidentiality (the remaining NIST
218 CSF Functions of Detect, Respond, and Recover) while this guide’s focus is on the needs prior to a loss of
219 data confidentiality (by focusing on the NIST CSF Functions Identify and Protect). The solution utilizes
220 commercially available tools to provide relevant capabilities such as automated data sensitivity
221 detection, user access controls for data, encryption of potential confidential data, and multifactor
222 authentication, among others.

223 1.3 Benefits

224 Organizations can use this guide to help:

- 225 ▪ Evaluate their data confidentiality concerns
- 226 ▪ Determine whether their data security needs align with the challenges described in these
227 documents
- 228 ▪ Conduct a gap analysis to determine the distance between the organization’s current state and
229 desired state with respect to data confidentiality
- 230 ▪ Perform an assessment of the feasibility of implementing any number of these solutions
- 231 ▪ Determine a business continuity analysis to identify potential impacts on business operations as
232 a result of a loss of data confidentiality.

233 2 How to Use This Guide

234 This NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide demonstrates a standards-based reference design and provides
235 users with the information they need to replicate the data confidentiality capabilities described in this
236 document. This reference design is modular and can be deployed in whole or in part.

237 This guide contains three volumes:

- 238 ▪ NIST SP 1800-28A: Executive Summary
- 239 ▪ NIST SP 1800-28B: Approach, Architecture, and Security Characteristics – what we built and why
240 (you are here)
- 241 ▪ NIST SP 1800-28C: How-To Guides – instructions for building the example solution

242 Depending on your role in your organization, you might use this guide in different ways:

243 **Business decision makers, including chief security and technology officers,** will be interested in the
244 *Executive Summary, NIST SP 1800-28A*, which describes the following topics:

- 245 ▪ challenges that enterprises face in identifying vulnerable assets and protecting them from data
- 246 breaches
- 247 ▪ example solution built at the NCCoE
- 248 ▪ benefits of adopting the example solution

249 **Technology or security program managers** who are concerned with how to identify, understand, assess,
250 and mitigate risk will be interested in this part of the guide, *NIST SP 1800-28B*, which describes what we
251 did and why. The following sections will be of particular interest:

- 252 ▪ Section 3.5, [Risk Assessment](#), provides a description of the risk analysis we performed
- 253 ▪ Section 3.6, [Security Control Map](#), maps the security characteristics of this example solution to
- 254 cybersecurity standards and best practices

255 You might share the *Executive Summary, NIST SP 1800-28A*, with your leadership team members to help
256 them understand the importance of adopting standards-based solutions to protecting against losses in
257 data confidentiality.

258 **IT professionals** who want to implement an approach like this will find the whole practice guide useful.
259 You can use the how-to portion of the guide, *NIST SP 1800-28C*, to replicate all or parts of the build
260 created in our lab. The how-to portion of the guide provides specific product installation, configuration,
261 and integration instructions for implementing the example solution. We do not re-create the product
262 manufacturers' documentation, which is generally widely available. Rather, we show how we
263 incorporated the products together in our environment to create an example solution.

264 This guide assumes that IT professionals have experience implementing security products within the
265 enterprise. While we have used a suite of commercial products to address this challenge, this guide does
266 not endorse these particular products. Your organization can adopt this solution or one that adheres to
267 these guidelines in whole, or you can use this guide as a starting point for tailoring and implementing
268 parts of a security architecture that protects against data breaches. Your organization's security experts
269 should identify the products that will best integrate with your existing tools and IT system infrastructure.
270 We hope that you will seek products that are congruent with applicable standards and best practices.
271 Section 3.6, [Technologies](#), lists the products we used and maps them to the cybersecurity and privacy
272 controls provided by this reference solution.

273 A NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide does not describe "the" solution, but a possible solution. This is a
274 draft guide. We seek feedback on its contents and welcome your input. Comments, suggestions, and
275 success stories will improve subsequent versions of this guide. Please contribute your thoughts to [ds-](mailto:ds-nccoe@nist.gov)
276 [nccoe@nist.gov](mailto:ds-nccoe@nist.gov).

277 **2.1 Typographic Conventions**

278 The following table presents typographic conventions used in this volume.

Typeface/Symbol	Meaning	Example
<i>Italics</i>	file names and path names; references to documents that are not hyperlinks; new terms; and placeholders	For language use and style guidance, see the NCCoE Style Guide.
Bold	names of menus, options, command buttons, and fields	Choose File > Edit .
Monospace	command-line input, onscreen computer output, sample code examples, and status codes	<code>mkdir</code>
Monospace Bold	command-line user input contrasted with computer output	<code>service sshd start</code>
blue text	link to other parts of the document, a web URL (uniform resource locator), or an email address	All publications from NIST's NCCoE are available at https://www.nccoe.nist.gov .

279 3 Approach

280 The NCCoE is developing a set of data confidentiality projects mapped to the five Functions of the NIST
 281 Cybersecurity Framework Core. This project centers on identifying and protecting vulnerable data from
 282 attack. Our commercial collaboration partners have volunteered to provide the products that provide
 283 this example solution for the problems raised in each of our use cases. Through this collaboration, our
 284 goal is to create actionable recommendations for organizations and individuals trying to solve data
 285 confidentiality issues.

286 3.1 Audience

287 The architecture of this project and accompanying documentation targets three distinct groups of
 288 readers. The first is those personally managing, implementing, installing and configuring IT security
 289 solutions for their organization. The walkthroughs of installation and configuration of the chosen
 290 commercial products, as well as any of our notes on lessons learned, work to ease the challenge of
 291 implementing security best practices. This guide also serves as a starting point for those addressing
 292 these security issues for the first time, and a reference for experienced admins who want to do better.

293 The second group are those tasked with establishing broader security policies for their organizations.
 294 Reviewing the threats each organization needs to account for and their potential solutions allows for
 295 more robust and efficient security policy to be generated with greater ease.

296 The final group are those individuals responsible for the legal ramifications of breaches of
 297 confidentiality. Many organizations have legal obligations to take steps to proactively protect the
 298 personal data or personally identifiable information (PII) of individuals they process. The ramifications
 299 for failing to adequately protect PII can have severe consequences for both individuals and follow on
 300 consequences for the organizations as a whole.

301 This guide will allow potential adopters to assess the feasibility of implementing data confidentiality best
302 practices within the IT systems of their own organization.

303 **3.2 Scope**

304 This document provides guidance on identifying potentially sensitive data and protecting against a loss
305 of data confidentiality. Refer to [Figure 1-1](#) to understand how this document fits within the larger set of
306 NCCoE Data Security projects, as organized by the CIA triad and the functions of the NIST Cybersecurity
307 Framework Core.

308 **3.3 Assumptions**

309 The technical solution developed at the NCCoE and represented in this guide does not incorporate the
310 non-technical aspects of managing the confidentiality of an organization's data. The non-technical
311 components could include (but are not limited to):

- 312 • applicable legal requirements based on pertinent jurisdictions
- 313 • corporate or other superseding policies relevant to confidentiality and privacy
- 314 • standard operating procedures in the event of a loss of data confidentiality
- 315 • public relations strategies

316 This project is guided by the following assumptions:

- 317 • The solution was developed in a laboratory environment and is limited in the size and scale of
318 data.
- 319 • Only a subset of products relevant to data confidentiality are included in this project, as such
320 organizations should consider the guiding principles of this document when evaluating their
321 organization's needs against the product landscape at the time of their IT implementation.

322 **3.4 Privacy Considerations**

323 Because privacy risks may arise as a result of a loss of confidentiality of data, this guide includes privacy
324 considerations. This section gives a primer for why privacy is important to protect, the relationship
325 between privacy and cybersecurity risk, as well as NIST's approach to privacy risk assessment.

326 In today's digital landscape, consumers conduct much of their lives on the internet. Data processing,
327 which includes any operations taken with data, including the collection, usage, storage, and sharing of
328 data by organizations, can result in privacy problems for individuals. Privacy risks can evolve with
329 changes in technology and associated data processing. How organizations treat privacy has a direct
330 bearing on their perceived trustworthiness. Recognizing the evolving privacy impacts of technology on
331 individuals, governments across the globe are working to address their concerns through new or
332 updated laws and regulations.


333 Following an open and transparent development process, NIST published the NIST Privacy Framework,
334 Version 1.0 to help organizations better identify and manage their privacy risks, build trust with
335 customers and partners, and meet their compliance obligations. The Privacy Framework Core provides
336 privacy outcomes that organizations may wish to achieve as part of a privacy risk management program.

337 The Privacy Framework also discusses privacy engineering objectives that can be used to help
 338 organizations prioritize their privacy risk management activities. The privacy engineering objectives are:

- 339 • Predictability: Enabling reliable assumptions by individuals, owners, and operators about data
 340 and their processing by a system
- 341 • Manageability: Providing the capability for granular administration of data, including collection,
 342 alteration, deletion, and selective disclosure
- 343 • Disassociability: Enabling the processing of data or events without association to individuals or
 344 devices beyond the operational requirements of the system

345 It is important for individuals and organizations to understand the relationship between cybersecurity
 346 and privacy. As noted in Section 1.2.1 of the *NIST Privacy Framework* [8], having a general understanding
 347 of the different origins of cybersecurity and privacy risks is important for determining the most effective
 348 solutions to address the risks. Figure 3-1 illustrates this relationship, showing that some privacy risks
 349 arise from cybersecurity risks, and some are unrelated to cybersecurity risks.

350 **Figure 3-1 Cybersecurity and Privacy Risk Relationship**



351 Though a data confidentiality breach may lead to privacy problems for individuals, it is important to note
 352 that privacy risks can arise without a cybersecurity incident. For example, an organization might process
 353 data in ways that violates an individual’s privacy without that data having been breached or
 354 compromised through a security incident. This type of issue can occur under a variety of scenarios, such
 355 as when data is stored for extended periods, beyond the need for which the information was initially
 356 collected.

357 Privacy risks arise from privacy events—the occurrence or potential occurrence of problematic data
 358 actions. The NIST Privacy Framework defines problematic data actions as data actions that may cause an
 359 adverse effect for individuals. Problematic data actions might arise by data processing simply for mission
 360 or business purposes. Privacy risk is the likelihood that individuals will experience problems resulting
 361 from data processing, and the impact should they occur. [16] As reflected in the overlap of Figure 31,
 362 analyzing these risks in parallel with cybersecurity risks can help organizations understand the full

363 consequences of impacts of data confidentiality breaches. Section 5.3 demonstrates scenarios where
364 privacy risks may arise and potential mitigations.

365 Based on the reference architecture, this build considered the data actions that potentially cause
366 problematic data actions.

367 3.5 Risk Assessment

368 NIST SP 800-30 Revision 1, *Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments*, states that risk is “a measure of the
369 extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, and typically a function of:
370 (i) the adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of
371 occurrence.” The guide further defines risk assessment as “the process of identifying, estimating, and
372 prioritizing risks to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, reputation),
373 organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation, resulting from the operation of
374 an information system. Part of risk management incorporates threat and vulnerability analyses, and
375 considers mitigations provided by security controls planned or in place.”

376 The NCCoE recommends that any discussion of risk management, particularly at the enterprise level,
377 begins with a comprehensive review of NIST SP 800-37 Revision 2, *Risk Management Framework for
378 Information Systems and Organizations* [12]—material that is available to the public. The Risk
379 Management Framework (RMF) [13] guidance proved to be invaluable in giving us a baseline to assess
380 risks, from which we developed the project, the security characteristics of the build, and this guide.

381 3.5.1 Security Risk Assessment

382 Security risk assessments often discuss the consideration of threats to an information system. NIST SP
383 800-30 Revision 1 defines a threat as “[a]ny circumstance or event with the potential to adversely
384 impact organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through an
385 information system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, or modification of information,
386 and/or denial of service”. Threats are actions that may compromise a system’s confidentiality, integrity,
387 or availability[11]. Threats evolve, and an organization needs to perform its own analysis when
388 evaluating threats and risks that the organization faces.

389 The following threats were considered during the development of the data confidentiality solution:

- 390 • exfiltration by malicious outsider actor
- 391 • exfiltration by malicious internal actor (privilege misuse)
- 392 • ransomware with threat to leak data
- 393 • non-malicious insider actor (accidental email)
- 394 • misplaced hardware

395 For a threat to be realized, a system, process or person must be vulnerable to a threat action. A
396 vulnerability is a deficiency or weakness that a threat source may exploit, resulting in a threat event.
397 Vulnerabilities may exist in a broader context. That is, they may be found in organizational governance
398 structures, external relationships, and mission/business processes.

399 Organizations should consider impact if a data confidentiality breach occurs including potential decline
400 in organizational trust and credibility affecting employees, customers, partners, stakeholders as well as
401 financial impacts due to loss of proprietary or other sensitive information.

402 3.5.2 Privacy Risk Assessment

403 This build also incorporates privacy as part of the build risk assessment. It is important for organizations
404 to address privacy risk as part of a comprehensive risk management process. The build utilized the NIST
405 Privacy Framework [7] and Privacy Risk Assessment Methodology (PRAM) [14] to identify and address
406 privacy risks.

407 As part of identifying privacy risks in this build, problematic data actions were correlated to observed
408 privacy risks. In many cases, the security capabilities in this build will help mitigate privacy risks, but
409 organizations should use caution to implement these capabilities in a way that does not introduce new
410 privacy risks.

411 Section 5.3 discusses problematic data action and privacy considerations for this build.

412 3.6 Technologies

413 Table 3-1 Products and Technologies lists the technologies used in this project and provides a mapping
414 among the generic application term, the specific product used, and the security control(s) that the
415 product provides. Refer to Table 6-1 Security Control Map for an explanation of the NIST Cybersecurity
416 Framework Subcategory identifiers. Table 3-1 also provides the Privacy Framework Subcategory
417 identifiers, and these are explained in [Appendix E](#).

418 Table 3-1 Products and Technologies


Component	Product	Capability	NIST Cybersecurity Framework Subcategories	NIST Privacy Framework Subcategories
Data Management	Avrio SIFT v1.0.5.R5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Discovers, tags, and protects sensitive files across the network 	ID.AM-2, PR.DS-1, PR.DS-3	ID.IM-P1, PR.DS-P1, PR.DS-P3
Data Protection	Qcor Forcefield v1.9h	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Protects data at-rest from unauthorized access and malicious modification 	PR.DS-1	PR.DS-P1
	PKWARE PKProtect v16.40.0010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provides data encryption at-rest and in-transit 	PR.DS-1, PR.DS-2	PR.DS-P1, PR.DS-P2
	StrongKey Tellaro	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provides a Web API (application programming interface) for encryption and tokenization, key management, and strong authentication 	PR.AC-7, PR.DS-2	PR.AC-P6, PR.DS-P2
User Access Controls	Cisco Duo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provides multi-factor authentication 	PR.AC-1, PR.AC-4, PR.AC-7	PR.AC-P1, PR.AC-P4, PR.AC-P6
Browser Isolation	Symantec Web Isolation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provides isolation of web browsers to protect from risky traffic Protects from malware and phishing threats Provides a privacy toggle that allows for user browsing data to be anonymized. Provides a login banner to inform individuals of data collection practices with web browsing 	PR.AC-5, PR.DS-2	PR.AC-P5, PR.DS-P2, CT.DP-P2, CM.AW-P3
Policy Enforcement	Cisco Duo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provides policy control on a global or per-application basis 	PR.IP-5	PR.PO-P4

Component	Product	Capability	NIST Cybersecurity Framework Subcategories	NIST Privacy Framework Subcategories
Logging	FireEye Helix	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provides a baseline for normal enterprise operations Provides logs and enables incident response 	ID.RA-1, ID.RA-2, ID.RA-3, PR.PT-1	CT.DM-P8
Network Protection	Dispel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provides remote access to network 	PR.AC-3, PR.AC-5	PR.AC-P3, PR.AC-P5

419 4 Architecture

420 This section presents the high-level architecture and a set of capabilities used in our data confidentiality
 421 reference design that identifies and protects assets from unauthorized access and disclosure.

422 **Figure 4-1 High Level Architecture**



423 Each of the capabilities implemented plays a role in mitigating data confidentiality attacks:

- 424 • **Data Management** allows discovery and tracking of files throughout the enterprise.
- 425 • **Data Protection** involves encryption and protection against disclosure of sensitive files.
- 426 • **User Access Controls** allows organizations to enforce access control policies, ensuring that only
 427 authorized users have access to sensitive files.
- 428 • **Browser Isolation** protects endpoints in the organization from malicious web-based malware by
 429 sandboxing and containing executables downloaded from the internet.
- 430 • **Policy Enforcement** ensures that endpoints in the organization conform to specified security
 431 policies, which can include certificate verification, installed programs, and machine posture.
- 432 • **Logging** creates a baseline of a normal enterprise activity for comparison in the event of a data
 433 confidentiality event.
- 434 • **Network Protection** ensures that hosts on the network only communicate in allowed ways,
 435 preventing side-channel attacks and attacks that rely on direct communication between hosts.
 436 Furthermore, it protects against potentially malicious hosts joining or observing traffic (encrypted or
 437 decrypted) traversing the network.

438 These capabilities work together to provide the functions Identify and Protect for the reference
439 architecture. The data management capability provides data inventory and asset management for files
440 in the enterprise; helps identify potentially sensitive files; and works with the data protection capability
441 to ensure potentially sensitive files are properly protected in the event of a breach. Because
442 organizations can be large and new sensitive files may be created daily, it is important to have the
443 capability to automate identification and protection of files at least partially. The data protection
444 capability and user access controls prevent data from being read by unauthorized parties. By ensuring
445 that only the correct people have access to data, and that data is properly encrypted and stored, it
446 becomes more difficult for adversaries to steal and disclose sensitive data.

447 The policy enforcement, network protection, and browser isolation capabilities work together to protect
448 endpoints such as laptops and desktops against common attack vectors. Malicious websites distributing
449 malware first pass through the browser isolation capability, which sandboxes webpages to ensure that
450 malware downloaded via malicious webpage cannot spread to the user or enterprise's system. Network
451 segmentation uses network layer policies to group endpoints into segments based on business needs. If
452 an endpoint is infected, network segmentation can limit impact by preventing malware from spreading
453 between segments. Policy enforcement ensures that systems remain up to date with organizationally
454 defined security policies. All of these functions feed into logging capabilities and provide organizations
455 with an understanding of their baseline of normal activity. These logs inform the organization of its
456 security posture before an event, so that the organization can adjust its policies as new information
457 about threats becomes available and take appropriate action.

458 **5 Security & Privacy Characteristic Analysis**

459 The following section is intended to help organizations understand the extent to which the project
460 meets its objective of demonstrating technologies and capabilities to help organizations mitigate data
461 confidentiality risk. To support this, we developed several scenarios which organizations may consider
462 when conducting their security and privacy risk analysis. For each scenario we discuss how our
463 architecture might help mitigate or limit security and privacy risks.

464 **5.1 Assumptions and Limitations**

465 The following analysis has the following limitations:

- 466 ▪ It is neither a comprehensive test of all security and privacy components, nor a red-team
467 exercise.
- 468 ▪ It cannot identify all weaknesses or risks.
- 469 ▪ It does not include the lab infrastructure. It is assumed that devices are hardened. Testing these
470 devices would reveal only weaknesses in implementation that would not be relevant to those
471 adopting this reference architecture.

472 **5.2 Security Scenarios**

473 Our security evaluation involved assessing how well the reference design addresses the security
474 characteristics that it was intended to support. Each scenario lays out a potential cybersecurity event
475 and discusses the responsibilities of an organization with respect to each event, and how the security

476 capabilities of our architecture would help an organization address the Cybersecurity Framework
477 Functions of **Identify** and **Protect** for that event.

478 Below is a list of the scenarios created to test the security capabilities of this architecture.

479 NOTE: The below scenarios map to the DRAFT NIST CSF 2.0. For a mapping to the NIST CSF 1.1 please
480 see Security Control Map in Appendix D.

481 5.2.1 Exfiltration of Encrypted Data

482 Table 5-1 Exfiltration of Encrypted Data Security Scenario

Description	An organization has unknowingly acquired a compromised machine from an outside source and has attached the machine to its trusted network. This machine periodically scans a certain part of the filesystem, which it has deemed to be potentially sensitive, and encrypts and uploads the contents to a malicious web host. Because the machine was assumed to be trusted due to human error, the delivery of this malware into the system is difficult to detect; it must be detected and stopped after it has already started running.
Associated DRAFT CSF 2.0 Subcategories	ID.AM-01, ID.AM-02, ID.AM-03, ID.AM-5, ID.RA-5, PR.AA-01, PR.AA-02, PR.AA-05, PR.DS-01, PR.DS-02, PR.DS-10, PR.PS-01, PR.PS-04
Organizational Response	In this scenario, the organization accepts an infected machine onto its network. As an example, this could be hardware ordered from a third-party vendor, potentially having been refurbished or modified before delivery to the organization. Because the organization connects the machine directly to the network, the acquisition of the malware happens immediately and without warning. It falls to the organization to protect sensitive data from this breach, as well as be able to identify the traffic generated by the malware as anomalous.
Identify	The Data Management capability is used to identify new sensitive data when it is created and track it throughout the organization. The results of this capability are used to inform protection and response capabilities about which data is at risk of targeting and the impact to the enterprise in the event of compromise.
Protect	The Data Protection capability provides encryption for sensitive data which has been identified as important, protecting it from unauthorized access in the event of an exfiltration attack. Another important aspect of the Protect function is the documentation of audit logs, with respect to sensitive data. The Logging capability provides a baseline for normal enterprise activity. This baseline can be used as a comparison point in the Detect phase to discover anomalies in network traffic and lead to the discovery of malicious exfiltration.

483

5.2.2 Spear Phishing Campaign

484 **Table 5-2 Spear Phishing Campaign Security Scenario**

Description	An unknown user has successfully launched a spear phishing attack, and in the process retrieved an authorized user’s login and password. This user has access to several of the organization’s databases, allowing them to both view and manipulate the data contained within. This exposes proprietary data to theft and manipulation/deletion.
Associated DRAFT CSF 2.0 Subcategories	PR.AA-01, PR.AA-02, PR.AA-03, PR.DS-01, PR.DS-02, PR.PS-01, PR.PS-04, DE.CM-09
Organizational Response	In this scenario, someone at the organization with privileged credentials has had their credentials compromised through a spear phishing email. The user may report this themselves if they retroactively realize it was a phishing attack, or they may not. The organization will need to deal with a privileged user account with access to the database being used by a malicious actor and is responsible for protecting assets from the compromised account.
Identify	Though identifying assets is an important function, in this scenario we are specifically focusing on the ability of a compromised user to access an in-use database, and do not have a specific need to identify the database as part of the scenario’s resolution, since the target is known.
Protect	<p>The Data Protection capability provides write-protection against alteration or deletion of saved data, as well as protection against reading the data through encryption of data-in-use.</p> <p>Another important aspect of the Protect function is the management of access permissions. The User Access Controls capability allows the database to be protected by a second layer of authentication separate from the user’s username and password. In the event of compromised credentials, the database is less likely to be impacted if two factors of authentication are required.</p> <p>Furthermore, acquisition of user credentials does not necessarily imply that a user’s physical system has been stolen. Policy Enforcement can take advantage of this by forcing computers connecting to organizational resources to be trusted via certificate or meet other requirements to ensure that a username and password is not enough to compromise critical resources.</p>

485

5.2.3 Ransomware

486 **Table 5-3 Ransomware Security Scenario**

Description	An employee of the company makes a mistake while entering the URL of their company’s email provider. This mistake takes them to an identical login page, but it is hosted by a malicious actor. When they enter their credentials on the login page, the page records their credentials, and forwards them to the actual login page, as if the credentials were
--------------------	--

	<p>mistyped. The malicious actor later uses these credentials to login as the employee. They download and run a malicious ransomware executable as the user. The ransomware executable uploads sensitive files to the malicious host website, which displays a notice that unless a ransom is paid, the sensitive files will remain publicly visible.</p>
Associated DRAFT CSF 2.0 Subcategories	ID.AM-01, ID.AM-02, ID.AM-03, ID.AM-5, ID.RA-5, PR.AA-01, PR.AA-02, PR.AA-03, PR.AA-05, PR.DS-01, PR.DS-02, PR.DS-10, PR.IR-01, PR.PS-01, PR.PS-04
Organizational Response	In this scenario, someone at the organization with privileged credentials has had their credentials compromised through a malicious webpage disguised as the organization’s email provider. The user may or may not report the attack, though there may be clues as to its existence - a user with account troubles and traffic going to a domain name very similar to the organization’s domain might be enough to send up red flags if noticed. Regardless, the organization will need to deal with a privileged user account being used to download malware and hold the confidentiality of sensitive files ransom.
Identify	The Data Management capability is used to identify new sensitive data when it is created and track it throughout the organization. The results of this capability are used to inform protection and response capabilities about which data is at risk of targeting and the impact to the enterprise in the event of compromise.
Protect	<p>The Data Protection capability provides encryption for sensitive data, protecting it from unauthorized access in the event of an exfiltration attack. Even if the data is stolen and released, encryption prevents the data from being used or read.</p> <p>Another important component of the Protect function is the documentation of audit logs, with respect to sensitive data. The Logging capability provides a baseline for normal enterprise activity. This baseline can be used as a comparison point in the Detect phase to discover anomalies in network traffic and user behavior, potentially allowing for the detection of a malicious actor accessing the user’s workstation outside of normal hours.</p> <p>Browser Isolation, in tandem with Network Protection, will prevent downloads of malicious files from websites and unknown ports, limiting the attacker’s ability to acquire their ransomware program after the system has been compromised. While the ability to download malicious programs onto the workstation may not completely stop determined attackers, it increases the difficulty and time required for the attack, allowing more time for Detection and Respond activities by the defending organization.</p>

487 5.2.4 Accidental Email

488 Table 5-4 Accidental Email Security Scenario

Description	A user of the organization accidentally cc's an individual on an email. This email has an attachment containing proprietary information which the cc'd individual is not cleared for. The individual copied on the email is considered a disgruntled employee, and when he sees this email, immediately downloads and saves these files.
Associated DRAFT CSF 2.0 Subcategories	ID.AM-01, ID.AM-02, ID.AM-03, ID.AM-5, ID.RA-5, PR.AA-01, PR.AA-02, PR.AA-03, PR.AA-05, PR.DS-01, PR.DS-02, PR.DS-10, PR.IR-01, PR.PS-04
Organizational Response	In the event of an accidental information leak via email, it is not unlikely that the event will be reported. Since there are multiple parties involved who are not malicious, it is possible that one of them will report the incident. Regardless of whether it is reported, however, the organization should be able to track the transfer of sensitive data to the unauthorized employee's system, and also prevent that employee from reading it.
Identify	The Data Management capability is used to identify new sensitive data when it is created and track it throughout the organization. The results of this capability are used to inform protection and response capabilities about which data is at risk and the impact to the enterprise in the event of an information leak.
Protect	The Data Protection capability provides encryption for sensitive information, protecting it from unauthorized access even if it is accidentally sent to unauthorized users. Another important component of the Protect function is documentation of audit logs, with respect to sensitive data. The Logging capability provides a baseline for normal enterprise activity. This baseline can be used as a comparison point in the Detect phase for reporting on data which has been transferred onto the systems of unauthorized users.

489 5.2.5 Lost Laptop

490 Table 5-5 Lost Laptop Security Scenario

Description	A user has lost their work laptop, which contains proprietary information. It is unknown if the laptop was targeted for its data and access credentials by a malicious actor, or if the incident was an unfortunate accident. For the purposes of this scenario, we assume the user of the laptop has reported the missing system on their own.
Associated DRAFT CSF 2.0 Subcategories	ID.AM-01, ID.AM-02, ID.AM-05, ID.AM-07, PR.AA-01, PR.AA-03, PR.DS-01, PR.DS-09, PR.PS-03
Organizational Response	In the event of a lost laptop, it is likely that the loss will be reported by the user, as the user will directly lose their ability to work. Although some aspects of this event are easier because of the user's knowledge of the system, it is important for the organization to determine the data that was on the laptop, the security posture of the laptop, and the access the laptop

	provided to the organization’s network, so that the loss can be accurately assessed, and further data loss can be prevented.
Identify	<p>The Data Management capability is used to identify new sensitive data when it is created and track it throughout the organization. The results of this capability are used to inform protection and response capabilities about which data is at risk and the impact to the enterprise in the event of a compromise.</p> <p>The Policy Enforcement capability can be used to force computers connecting to organizational resources to meet requirements regarding which programs are installed. While this capability typically falls under the Protect function, knowing the security posture of assets in the enterprise is an important Identify function. When policy enforcement is used to ensure the presence of encryption capabilities, for example, the enterprise has some assurance that data on the workstation has not been compromised.</p>
Protect	<p>The Data Protection capability provides encryption for the laptop and prevents sensitive data from being read.</p> <p>Another important aspect of the Protect function is the management of access permissions. The User Access Controls capability allows the network to be protected by two layers of authentication. Although the laptop may be compromised, requiring user account credentials as well as a second factor of authentication protects the network from further compromise.</p> <p>Policy Enforcement can be used to force computers connecting to organizational resources to meet requirements regarding which programs are installed, which helps to ensure that lost or stolen machines will have adequate data protection and user access control in place to prevent the loss of data in the event of a lost or stolen laptop.</p>

491 **5.2.6 Privilege Misuse**

492 **Table 5-6 Privilege Misuse Security Scenario**

Description	A malicious insider navigates to one of the organization’s shared drives, and finds sensitive information stored there. Looking to sell this information to competitors, the insider copies the information to his personal USB (universal series bus) drive. The insider also prints these files.
Associated DRAFT CSF 2.0 Subcategories	ID.AM-01, ID.AM-02, ID.AM-05, ID.AM-07, ID.RA-03, PR.AA-03, PR.AA-05, PR.AA-06, PR.DS-01, PR.DS-02, PR.DS-09, PR.PS-04, PR.IR-01
Organizational Response	It is unlikely that a malicious insider will advertise their misdoings; it falls to the organization to discover the insider behavior and protect assets from them. Through proper access control and encryption of sensitive files, organizations can hinder the insider’s attempt to exfiltrate useful data. It is unlikely that an organization will be able to completely stop a determined insider through technical means; however, organizations should use the

	technical capabilities they have to limit the exfiltration, while also gathering information about the extent of the loss to aid in the pursuit of legal resolutions to the incident.
Identify	The Data Management capability is used to identify new sensitive data when it is created and track it throughout the organization. The results of this capability are used to inform protection and response capabilities about which data is at risk and the impact to the enterprise in the event of a compromise. In the event of a malicious insider attempting to exfiltrate data, it is important to know which data was accessible on the machines accessed by the insider, as well as the sensitivity levels of the affected data.
Protect	The Data Protection capability provides encryption for sensitive data , protecting it from unauthorized access. While a malicious insider may be able to decrypt data relevant to their work role, irrelevant data which is encrypted and managed properly will be significantly less useful to the insider.
	Another important capability within the Protect Function is the management of access permissions. The User Access Controls can prevent unauthorized users from accessing sensitive files in the first place, preventing copying and printing functionality.
	While user access controls and data protection ensure that the user only has access to some data, ultimately, malicious insiders tend to have some level of access to data due to their role in the organization. Logging provides a baseline for normal enterprise activity. This baseline can be used as a comparison point in the Detect phase for reporting on data which has been exfiltrated from the organization. In the event of exfiltration by a malicious insider, logs can help determine what data was accessed and printed and can aid the organization in recovering from the exfiltration, potentially in non-technical ways, such as through the legal system or law enforcement.

493

5.2.7 Eavesdropping

494

Table 5-7 Eavesdropping Security Scenario

Description	A malicious outsider has gained access to the network traffic of the organization. They possess the capability to intercept and hijack internal communications via man-in-the-middle attack. A user begins uploading a sensitive proposal for a new project. The malicious outsider is able to intercept and view these files.
Associated DRAFT CSF 2.0 Subcategories	ID.AM-01, ID.AM-03, ID.AM-07, PR.AA-05, PR.AA-06, PR.DS-01, PR.DS-02, PR.PS-04, PR.IR-01
Organizational Response	In this scenario, an organization will likely be able to see the introduction of a new device on the network. In this example, a user's sensitive upload is stolen while it is in transit. The user may see warnings about HTTPS or invalid certificates due to the nature of the attack, and the organization

	may notice anomalous traffic going through the new device on the network. The organization is responsible for identifying the new device as malicious, protecting data intercepted by it through encryption, and mitigating its ability to communicate with trusted enterprise machines.
Identify	The Data Management capability is used to identify new sensitive data when it is created and track it throughout the organization. The results of this capability are used to inform protection and response capabilities about which data is at risk and the impact to the enterprise. In this scenario, a new project proposal is created - the data management capability is used to identify the creation of new sensitive data and track it throughout the enterprise.
Protect	The Data Protection capability provides encryption for sensitive data, protecting it from unauthorized access. While a malicious third party on the network may be able to intercept the data in transit, encryption prevents the third party from being able to read the intercepted data.

Another important component of the Protect Function is the documentation of audit logs, with respect to sensitive data. The Logging capability provides a baseline for normal enterprise activity. This baseline can be used as a comparison point in the Detect phase for noticing anomalous network activity, such as a malicious host on the network acting as a proxy between two systems.

Network Protection is also an important capability for protecting network traffic from malicious adversaries. Using network segmentation, zero trust, and moving target defense capabilities, unrecognized devices can be prevented from identifying, reconnoitering, and accessing the network or communicating with trusted hosts.

495 5.3 Privacy Scenarios

496 The following section describes scenarios an organization may consider when conducting their privacy
 497 risk assessment. Based on the reference architecture used in this project each scenario is examined for
 498 data actions that give rise to potential privacy problems for individuals. Each table documents
 499 problematic data actions taken from the NIST Catalogue of Problematic Data Actions and Problems [16],
 500 and lists privacy mitigations mapped to the NIST Privacy Framework [7]. For the privacy risks analyzed,
 501 consideration was given to how the data is processed. The specific privacy risks found within the
 502 scenarios are derived from the architecture components and the data flows used in this build, but to the
 503 extent possible, generalized for organizations using similar components and capabilities.

504 Organizations may collect information affecting privacy when implementing cybersecurity or privacy-
 505 based controls. For example, an organization might implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) using
 506 information such as mobile phone number. Even though collecting this information helps to protect
 507 systems and data by supporting capabilities like non-repudiation and system auditing, it may also
 508 generate privacy risks.

509 When implementing cybersecurity or privacy-based controls, organizations should consider the benefit a
510 user realizes, both from use of a service and securing that service before processing information
511 affecting privacy. This benefit can be weighed against the risk posed to both individuals and the
512 organization should a privacy event occur.

513 For example, using MFA mentioned above, users may feel compelled to provide information affecting
514 privacy, such as their personal phone number for SMS (short messaging service) authentication, to gain
515 access to systems or services. However, if the user is accessing publicly available information, the risk of
516 the misuse of information from collecting personal phone numbers may be greater than the security
517 benefit for protecting the low-sensitivity information. Additionally, if given the option, users may elect
518 to use alternative authentication methods that are less privacy-invasive, such as using a work phone
519 number over a personal number or a hardware MFA authenticator over SMS authentication. The NIST
520 Privacy Risk Assessment Methodology (PRAM) refers to this problematic data action, where the user is
521 compelled to provide information disproportionate to the purpose or outcome of the transaction, as
522 induced disclosure.


523 Organizations should consider these types of risks as they design and implement systems. As
524 demonstrated in the scenarios below, risk mitigations should be implemented within the design to limit
525 privacy risks. These privacy risk mitigations might include the following, among others:

- 526 • Understand where and how information is processed, including collection practices and system
527 components that store and transmit this information (data flows and mapping)
- 528 • Understand the risks and benefits of collecting different data elements to determine if it should not
529 be collected
- 530 • Keep data only as long as needed for its function and destroy or de-identify it otherwise using
531 proper data lifecycle management practices and in accordance with applicable laws and policies
- 532 • Keep personal data segregated in a different repository, when practicable
- 533 • Encrypt data at rest, in transit, and in use
- 534 • Use role-based access controls
- 535 • Consider what measures should be taken to address predictability and manageability before
536 deciding whether data can be used beyond its initial expected and agreed upon use
- 537 • Implement privacy-enhancing technologies to increase disassociability while retaining confidentiality
538 and the capability to process data for mission or business purposes

539 5.3.1 User Login with Multifactor Authentication

540 Phishing-resistant multifactor authentication is a security best practice. The architecture recommends
541 the use of a password, pin (personal identification number) or biometric with an asymmetric
542 cryptographic key for authentication. However, it is common practice for organizations to offer a variety
543 of MFA solutions. This can include user-owned mobile devices, which may impact privacy risk [17].

544 Figure 5-1 Multifactor Authentication Data Flow Diagram




Data Type	Data Action	Privacy Impact
Username	Username is stored by the user workstation and transferred across the authentication process to help identify the transaction.	Usernames potentially contain inferable PII such as user's first and last names
Client IP Address	The client IP (Internet Protocol) address is stored by the user workstation, and transferred as part of communications where it is an endpoint.	IP addresses can be used to derive PII such as user's general location
Transaction Identifier	The transaction identifier is generated by active directory and transferred to the MFA solution and the mobile device.	Cross-component identifiers for a transaction can be used to re-identify information that was otherwise anonymized, such as connections between a user's name and their cell phone number.
Mobile device information	The mobile device information is stored by the MFA solution and the mobile device and transferred as a part of the communication between the mobile device and MFA solution.	Information about a user's mobile device, such as device type and version, can be used to infer privacy-impacting information such as the cost of their personal devices. Furthermore, user cell-phone numbers used in certain MFA transactions are PII.

Scenarios	Privacy Risk	Problematic Data Actions	Privacy Mitigations
<p>User authentication may use a mobile device as an authenticator, which can be personally or organizationally owned.</p>	<p>Mobile devices are a popular option for authentication processes. Personal information can be transferred in the process of authenticating. This can include phone number and location information. Users' non-work activity may be tracked by an organization.</p>	<p>Context: Authentication processes that utilize personally owned mobile devices can require the use of information that is personal to the user, such as phone numbers and other metadata. The tracking could extend beyond the work environment or even within the work environment be disproportionate to the security needs leading to unanticipated revelations about user activities or degradation of the dignity or autonomy of users.</p> <p>Problematic Data Action: Unanticipated Revelation, Induced Disclosure</p> <p>Problem: Loss of Autonomy: Users have no control over what information is shared in this scheme. Users may not feel comfortable using their own personal information as a security feature for an organizational service. Loss of Trust: Users may not feel comfortable with their personal phone numbers and device information being shared with third-party applications and Software as a Service providers.</p>	<p>Predictability: Organizations should inform users of information that is viewed and collected by login tools, such as through privacy notices when devices are enrolled. System administrators should have limited access to user authentication information</p> <p>Manageability: Organizations that leverage user's personal devices for user login processes should consider tools that give the users optionality for registering different types of authenticators, including those that do not use personal devices and information. In this build, Duo offers a variety of authentication options, such as a hardware-based authenticator.</p> <p>Organizations should audit tools to determine what information they are using and collecting.</p> <p>Disassociability: Organizations should explore capabilities and configurations that allow for the de-identification of phone numbers and other personal information, such as the capability to replace a phone number with placeholder text or privacy-enhancing cryptographic techniques to limit the tracking of users.</p>

545 **5.3.2 Authentication to Virtual Desktop Interface Solution**

546 The reference architecture in this document demonstrates a Virtual Desktop Interface (VDI) solution to
 547 facilitate secure access to organizational resources and data. Organizations may allow users' personal
 548 devices to access corporate resources using the VDI solution. Organizations should consider the privacy
 549 risk of installing VDI software on personally owned devices, information revealed by the VDI protocol,
 550 and monitoring of user activity while in the virtual environment.

551 **Figure 5-2 Virtual Desktop Interface Data Flow Diagram**



Data Type	Data Action	Privacy Impact
Username	The username is stored by the user workstation and active directory. It is transferred as part of the	Usernames potentially contain inferable PII such as user’s first and last names
Client IP Address	The Client IP Address is stored on the user workstation, and transferred as part of transactions and connections it generates.	IP addresses can be used to derive PII such as user’s general location
Token Identifier	A Token Identifier is generated by Active Directory in support of the authentication process and transferred to the VDI.	Token identifiers can be used to re-identify other information affecting privacy that occur as part of transactions.
One-time password	A One-time Password is generated by the VDI to authenticate the RDP (remote desktop protocol) connection and is transferred to and stored on the user workstation.	
Client Time Zone	The Client Time Zone is stored by the user workstation and transferred as part of an RDP connection to the virtual desktop.	Along with IP addresses, time zones specifically provide information about a user’s location
Client Computer Name	The Client Computer Name is stored by the user workstation and transferred as part of an RDP connection to the virtual desktop.	User’s personal device names can include inferable PII, such as personal names and device locations.


552

Scenarios	Privacy Risk	Problematic Data Actions	Privacy Mitigations
<p>User logs into a Virtual Desktop Interface solution from a personally or organizationally owned device.</p>	<p>Central login platforms can be connected to by a variety of devices, which may be personally owned by the user. Information that can be associated with the user, such as their device information or location, may be transmitted to security tools as part of the authentication process.</p>	<p>Context: Users operating under a BYOD or remote work scheme may not expect that certain data is under organizational purview. This can include their location, personal device metadata, and operating hours.</p> <p>Problematic Data Action: Surveillance, Unanticipated Revelation</p> <p>Problem:</p> <p>Loss of Trust. Users may not feel comfortable with this information being shared with third-party applications, or the company in general.</p> <p>Dignity Loss. Users may have information, such as their physical location and work hours, revealed to organizations in an undesired fashion.</p>	<p>Predictability: Users should be informed of information that is viewed and collected by login and network access tools such as Dispel, through either a login banner or other alert mechanism. Use privacy enhancing technologies and techniques to de-identify user, user ID and IP address like obfuscation, communication anonymization, data minimization, and pseudonymization, among others.</p> <p>Manageability: Organizations that include user's personal devices in day-to-day operation should audit tools to determine what information they are using and collecting and who has access rights</p> <p>Confidentiality: Organizations should mandate strict access control for the management and configuration of user login services, such as with MFA.</p> <p>Availability: Organizations that utilize central login platforms as their entry should consider the robustness of their platforms and systems. A loss of access to these systems can lead to an inability for users to access their data.</p>

554 **5.3.3 Automated Data Movement with Data Management Solution**

555 The reference architecture uses data management technology that allows for the scanning files for
556 highly sensitive information and establishment of policy that automatically moves sensitive content to
557 secure storage. Files with detected PII or other sensitive information may be moved in ways that are
558 unexpected to the user, potentially creating privacy concerns.

559 **Figure 5-3 Data Management Data Flow Diagram**



Data Key


- 1. File metadata (Name, Date of Modification, File Type, Author)
- 2. File contents

Data Type	Data Action	Privacy Impact
File metadata	File metadata is stored on the user workstation, along with file contents. It is transferred along with file contents to the Data Management Solution and the Protected Network Share as part of the data movement operation. It is also used to identify data for deletion by the Data Management Solution.	File metadata can include information affecting privacy that is not derivable from file contents, such as the file name, date of modification, and author. This can be used to derive information such as active work hours and can lead to false assumptions about an individual
File contents	File contents are stored on the user workstation and transferred through the Data Management Solution to the Protected Network Share.	The privacy impact of file contents rely heavily on the data being used by an enterprise. This information can include SSNs, credit card information, health data, and other PII. Privacy impact and regulatory burden should be specifically considered and analyzed by organizations implementing these sorts of security solutions.

Scenarios	Privacy Risk	Problematic Data Actions	Privacy Mitigations
<p>Data generated in areas moderated by data management solutions are potentially duplicated, moved, or deleted in compliance with organizational policy.</p>	<p>Movement of data by external tools can lead to information being placed in unexpected or unintended places. This can lead to user confusion and a loss of trust in the organization, as well as data being made vulnerable to discovery and exfiltration</p>	<p>Context: Moving data from the place in which it was created or saved can create confusion for users and expose information in ways the user did not intend.</p> <p>Problematic Data Action: Appropriation, Unanticipated Revelation</p> <p>Problem:</p> <p>Loss of Trust. Users may be uncomfortable working in protected zones if they do not trust that their data will be kept under their control.</p> <p>Loss of Autonomy. Users may see involuntary data movement as a loss of their ability to govern the data they generate.</p>	<p>Predictability: Zones under the purview of data management and protection tools should be clearly defined and expressed to the user, such as through clearly understood network share names. Notice should be given to users who are impacted by the data management solution, such as by leaving a stub file at the original location.</p> <p>Manageability: Organizations seeking to include these capabilities should make sure they use solutions that can be configured to mitigate their inherent privacy risk.</p> <p>Confidentiality: Tools that provide the ability to analyze and move data should only be governed by system administrators. The automatic movement of data should only move data to locations only accessible by the user who created the original data or to folder with equal or more stringent access rights than the originating location. Furthermore, data locations are protected by IDAM (identity and access management controls) controls such as MFA.</p>

561 **5.3.4 Monitoring by Logging Solution**

562 This reference architecture generates logs used to aid in response and recovery activities. These logs are
 563 essential for proper data management and incident response. However organizations should consider
 564 the privacy of information collected by logs when they are created, transmitted and stored.

565 **Figure 5-4 Logging Data Flow Diagram****Data Key**

1. Usernames, IP addresses, web traffic history

566 The utilization of the security architecture, and the logs their user generates, can interact with and
 567 generate information that affects privacy. The use of a logging solution requires that data and metadata
 568 about user's activity be generated and stored in an additional location. Depending on the details and
 569 scope of the logging tool, this can extend the effective domain of information that affects privacy used
 570 by those tools. Some examples of information affecting privacy utilized in such transactions is given
 571 below:


Data Type	Data Action	Privacy Impact
IP Addresses	IP Addresses are stored and transferred by enterprise systems as well as the logging solution. They are transferred by and through the security solutions.	IP addresses can be used to determine rough locations for user-owned machines. Additionally, IP Addresses can be common across logs from many security tools, allowing for anonymized data to be re-identified.
Device Identifiers	Device Identifiers are stored and transferred by enterprise systems as well as the logging solution. They are transferred by and through the security solutions.	Under certain circumstances, device Identifiers, such as MAC (media access control) addresses, can be used to identify individuals from data that has been de-identified, or allow for privacy-impacting correlations to be made between data logs.

Scenarios	Privacy Risk	Problematic Data Actions	Privacy Mitigations
<p>Security tools generate metadata that is transferred to a logging solution, either directly or via an on-site forwarder.</p>	<p>The security system passively creates data about users, their data, and their activities. This information is transmitted across the network and stored remotely.</p>	<p>Context: Logging systems can contain private data. These logs are transmitted off the device or system in which they were created to other systems where log information is aggregated. The privacy impact of each log and the aggregation of logs must be considered. Furthermore, this information is exposed to admin user who have access to either the individual or aggregated logs.</p> <p>Problematic Data Action: Unanticipated Revelation, Re-identification, Surveillance</p> <p>Problem:</p> <p>Loss of trust. Users may not expect the scope of information created and tracked by logs, even if they understand the scope of the security infrastructure.</p> <p>Dignity Loss. Embarrassing or undesired privacy information may be inferred about individuals whose actions generate logging information.</p>	<p>Predictability: The existence of monitoring systems should be disclosed to users upon their access to organizational systems, such as through a login banner. Use privacy enhancing technologies and techniques to de-identify user ID and IP address like obfuscation, communication anonymization, data minimization, and pseudonymization, among others.</p> <p>Manageability: Organizations should evaluate how logs can be configured to collect the least amount of information necessary in order to meet security needs, especially when security tools are aggregating log information across multiple systems.</p> <p>Disassociability: Organizations should consider de-identification functions for log creation, transmission, storage and aggregation. For example, privacy-relevant information such as the user’s name can be disassociated from their IP address or device identifier when collecting log information.</p> <p>Confidentiality: Tools that generate or store logs should have strict access control applied to them such as MFA.</p>

572 **5.3.5 User Web Browsing with Browser Isolation Solution**

573 Web isolation solutions must have governance over all user web traffic to be effective. This can generate
 574 privacy concerns to users by increasing the risk of their browsing data being misused.

575 **Figure 5-5 Browser Isolation Data Flow Diagram**



Data Key

- 1. Client IP Address
- 2. User browsing metadata (Target IP address, URL, Session information)
- 3. User browsing contents

Data Type	Data Action	Privacy Impact
Client IP Address	IP Addresses are stored on the User Workstation and sent by network connections to and from it.	IP addresses can be used to derive PII such as a user’s general location
User browsing metadata	User browsing metadata is generated on the user workstation and sent to and from the user workstation, as well as to and from the web isolation solution to the web server.	HTTP/S traffic, even when encrypted, relies on unencrypted metadata such as time stamps, source IPs, and destination IPs. These materials can be used to generate information that affects privacy, such as a specific user’s browsing habits.
User browsing contents	User browsing contents are generated on the user workstation as well as the web server. They are sent back and forth between the web server and the web isolation solution and delivered back to the user workstation.	Tools that can view and inspect the contents of a user’s web browsing session could further impact user privacy. This can include a user accessing their bank and checking balance information, accessing information from their healthcare provider, and so on.

Scenarios	Privacy Risk	Problematic Data Actions	Privacy Mitigations
<p>Data from user web browsing flows through web isolation solutions, centralizing information about employee web browsing.</p>	<p>Web monitoring tools are used to detect malicious web traffic patterns or access requests to unsafe domains but may also collect and transmit information that affects the user’s privacy.</p>	<p>Context: User browsing data can reveal information affecting privacy, such as personal health or financial information. Administrators can centrally view user browsing metadata at this location. This information may also be forwarded to other third-party tools.</p> <p>Problematic Data Action: Surveillance, Unanticipated Revelation</p> <p>Problem: Loss of Trust. Users may perceive the monitoring of their web traffic as a form of surveillance which may negatively impact the trust they have in their IT systems and/or organization.</p>	<p>Predictability: Users should be informed on the capabilities of web monitoring and related tools, such as through a login banner. Use privacy enhancing technologies and techniques to de-identify user ID and IP address like obfuscation, communication anonymization, data minimization, and pseudonymization, among others.</p> <p>Manageability: Organizations seeking to use web monitor tools should assess their privacy preserving capabilities. In this reference architecture Symantec Web Isolation provides a privacy toggle that allows for user browsing data to be anonymized.</p> <p>Disassociability: Organizations should employ de-identification options for data when appropriate. In this reference architecture the privacy toggle provided by Symantec Web Isolation was enabled, which anonymized user browsing data.</p> <p>Confidentiality: Organizations should mandate strict access controls for security tools that can impact user privacy, including the use of MFA.</p>

577 **6 Future Build Considerations**

578 As shown in [Figure 1-1](#), the NCCoE Data Security work that remains to be addressed within the
579 framework of the CIA triad is Data Availability. The Data Security team plans to evaluate the current
580 landscape of Data Availability challenges that organizations face and determine future relevant projects
581 to address those needs.

Appendix A**List of Acronyms**

API	Application Programming Interface
BYOD	Bring Your Own Device
CIA	Confidentiality Integrity Availability
CIS	Center for Internet Security
CNSSI	Committee on National Security Systems Instruction
COBIT	Control Objectives for Information and Related Technologies
CRADA	Cooperative Research And Development Agreement
CSC	Critical Security Controls
CSF	Cybersecurity Framework
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
FIPPS	Fair Information Privacy Principles
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS	Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IDAM	Identity and Access Management
IEC	International Electrotechnical Commission
IP	Internet Protocol
ISA	International Society of Automation
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
IT	Information Technology
ITL	Information Technology Laboratory
MAC	Media Access Control
MFA	Multi Factor Authentication
NCCoE	National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NIST IR	NIST Interagency or Internal Report
PDA	Problematic Data Action
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
PIN	Personal Identification Number
PRAM	Privacy Risk Assessment Methodology
RDP	Remote Desktop Protocol
RMF	Risk Management Framework
SMS	Short Messaging Service
SP	Special Publication
URL	Uniform Resource Locator
USB	Universal Series Bus

DRAFT

VDI

Virtual Desktop Interface

Access Control

The process of granting or denying specific requests to 1) obtain and use information and related information processing services and 2) enter specific physical facilities (e.g., federal buildings, military establishments, border crossing entrances).

SOURCE: Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 201-3

Adversary

Person, group, organization, or government that conducts or has the intent to conduct detrimental activities.

SOURCE: CNSSI 4009-2015

Asset

A major application, general support system, high impact program, physical plant, mission critical system, personnel, equipment, or a logically related group of systems.

SOURCE: Committee on National Security Systems Instruction (CNSSI) 4009-2015

Authentication

Verifying the identity of a user, process, or device, often as a prerequisite to allowing access to resources in an information system.

SOURCE: FIPS 200

Authorization

Access privileges granted to a user, program, or process or the act of granting those privileges.

SOURCE: CNSSI 4009-2015

Breach

The loss of control, compromise, unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized acquisition, or any similar occurrence where: a person other than an authorized user accesses or potentially accesses personally identifiable information; or an authorized user accesses personally identifiable information for another than authorized purpose.

SOURCE: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5

Control

The means of managing risk, including policies, procedures, guidelines, practices, or organizational structures, which can be of an administrative, technical, management, or legal nature.

SOURCE: NIST SP 800-160 Vol. 2 Rev. 1

Confidentiality	<p>Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information.</p> <p>SOURCE: FIPS 200</p>
Data	<p>A subset of information in an electronic format that allows it to be retrieved or transmitted.</p> <p>SOURCE: CNSSI 4008-2015</p>
Data Action	<p>A system/product/service data life cycle operation, including, but not limited to collection, retention, logging, generation, transformation, use, disclosure, sharing, transmission, and disposal.</p> <p>SOURCE: NIST Privacy Framework Version 1.0</p>
Disassociability	<p>Enabling the processing of PII or events without association to individuals or devices beyond the operational requirements of the system.</p> <p>SOURCE: NISTIR 8062</p>
Encrypt	<p>Cryptographically transform data to produce cipher text.</p> <p>SOURCE: CNSSI 4009-2015</p>
Enterprise	<p>An entity of any size, complexity, or positioning within an organizational structure.</p> <p>SOURCE: NIST SP 800-72</p>
Event	<p>Any observable occurrence in a network or system.</p> <p>SOURCE: CNSSI 4009-2015</p>
Exfiltration	<p>The unauthorized transfer of information from an information system.</p> <p>SOURCE: CNSSI 4009-2015</p>
Incident	<p>An occurrence that actually or potentially jeopardizes the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information system or the information the system processes, stores, or transmits or that constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of security policies, security procedures, or acceptable use policies.</p> <p>SOURCE: FIPS 200</p>

Integrity Guarding against improper information modification or destruction and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity.

SOURCE: FIPS 200

Key Management The activities involving handling of cryptographic keys and other related security parameters (e.g. passwords) during the entire life cycle of the keys, including their generation, storage, establishment, entry and output, and destruction.

SOURCE: CNSSI 4009-2015

Manageability Providing the capability for granular administration of PII including alteration, deletion, and selective disclosure.

SOURCE: NISTIR 8062

Malware Hardware, firmware, or software that is intentionally included or inserted in a system for a harmful purpose.

SOURCE: CNSSI 4009-2015

Mitigation A decision, action, or practice intended to reduce the level of risk associated with one or more threat events, threat scenarios, or vulnerabilities.

SOURCE: NIST SP 1800-160 Vol. 2 Rev. 1

Multi-Factor Authentication Authentication using two or more factors to achieve authentication. Factors include: (i) something you know (e.g. password/personal identification number (PIN)); (ii) something you have (e.g., cryptographic identification device, token); or (iii) something you are (e.g., biometric).

SOURCE: CNSSI 4009-2015

Phishing A technique for attempting to acquire sensitive data, such as bank account numbers, through a fraudulent solicitation in email or on a web site, in which the perpetrator masquerades as a legitimate business or reputable person.

SOURCE: CNSSI 4009-2015

Predictability Enabling reliable assumptions by individuals, owners, and operators about PII and its processing by a system.

SOURCE: NISTIR 8062

Risk The level of impact on organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, or individuals resulting from the operation of an information system given the potential impact of a threat and the likelihood of that threat occurring.

SOURCE: FIPS 200

Security Control The safeguards or countermeasures prescribed for an information system or an organization to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its information.

SOURCE: NIST SP 800-53

Security Policy A set of rules that governs all aspects of security-relevant system and system component behavior.

SOURCE: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5

Spear Phishing A colloquial term that can be used to describe any highly targeted phishing attack.

SOURCE: CNSSI 4009-2015

Threat Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through a system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of information, and/or denial of service.

SOURCE: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5

Vulnerability Weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat source.

SOURCE: FIPS 200

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636 [repository](https://www.nist.gov/privacy-framework/resource-repository)

637 **Appendix D Security Control Map**

638 The following table lists the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Functions, Categories, and Subcategories
 639 addressed by this project and maps them to relevant NIST standards, industry standards, and controls
 640 and best practices.

641 **Table 6-1 Security Control Map**

Cybersecurity Framework v1.1			Standards & Best Practices
Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
IDENTIFY (ID)	Asset Management (ID.AM)	ID.AM-2: Software platforms and applications within the organization are inventoried	CIS CSC 2 COBIT 5 BAI09.01, BAI09.02, BAI09.05 ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.4 ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.8 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.1.1, A.8.1.2, A.12.5.1 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-8, PM-5
	Risk Assessment (ID.RA)	ID.RA-1: Asset vulnerabilities are identified and documented	CIS CSC 4 COBIT 5 APO12.01, APO12.02, APO12.03, APO12.04, DSS05.01, DSS05.02 ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3, 4.2.3.7, 4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.12 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.6.1, A.18.2.3 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-2, CA-7, CA-8, RA3, RA-5, SA-5, SA-11, SI-2, SI-4, SI-5
		ID.RA-2: Cyber threat intelligence is received from information sharing forums and sources	CIS CSC 4 COBIT 5 BAI08.01 ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3, 4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.12 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.4 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SI-5, PM-15, PM-16

Cybersecurity Framework v1.1			Standards & Best Practices
Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
		ID.RA-3: Threats, both internal and external, are identified and documented	CIS CSC 4 COBIT 5 APO12.01, APO12.02, APO12.03, APO12.04 ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3, 4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.12 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 Clause 6.1.2 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 RA-3, SI-5, PM-12, PM16
PROTECT (PR)	Identity Management, Authentication and AccessControl (PR.AC)	PR.AC-1: Identities and credentials are issued, managed, verified, revoked, and audited for authorized devices, users and processes	CIS CSC 1, 5, 15, 16 COBIT 5 DSS05.04, DSS06.03 ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.5.1 ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 1.1, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-1, AC-2, IA-1, IA-2, IA-3, IA-4, IA-5, IA-6, IA-7, IA-8, IA-9, IA-10, IA-11
		PR.AC-3: Remote access is managed	CIS CSC 12 COBIT 5 APO13.01, DSS01.04, DSS05.03 ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.6.6 ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 1.13, SR 2.6 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2, A.11.2.6, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-1, AC-17, AC-19, AC-20, SC-15
		PR.AC-4: Access permissions and authorizations are managed, incorporating the principles of least privilege and separation of duties	CIS CSC 3, 5, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18 COBIT 5 DSS05.04 ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.7.3 ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.1 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.2, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-1, AC-2, AC-3, AC5, AC-6, AC-14, AC-16, AC-24

Cybersecurity Framework v1.1			Standards & Best Practices
Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
		PR.AC-5: Network integrity is protected (e.g., network segregation, network segmentation)	CIS CSC 9, 14, 15, 18 COBIT 5 DSS01.05, DSS05.02 ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.4 ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.1, SR 3.8 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.13.1.1, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4, AC-10, SC-7
		PR.AC-7: Users, devices, and other assets are authenticated (e.g., single-factor, multi-factor) commensurate with the risk of the transaction (e.g., individuals' security and privacy risks and other organizational risks)	CIS CSC 1, 12, 15, 16 COBIT 5 DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.10 ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9
	Data Security (PR.DS)	PR.DS-1: Data-at-rest is protected	CIS CSC 13, 14 COBIT 5 APO01.06, BAI02.01, BAI06.01, DSS04.07, DSS05.03, DSS06.06 ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.4, SR 4.1 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.3 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 MP-8, SC-12, SC-28
		PR.DS-2: Data-in-transit is protected	CIS CSC 13, 14 COBIT 5 APO01.06, DSS05.02, DSS06.06 ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.1, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.2 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.3, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.3, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SC-8, SC-11, SC-12

Cybersecurity Framework v1.1			Standards & Best Practices
Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
		PR.DS-3: Assets are formally managed throughout removal, transfers, and disposition	CIS CSC 1 COBIT 5 BAI09.03 ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.4.4.1 ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 4.2 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.3, A.8.3.1, A.8.3.2, A.8.3.3, A.11.2.5, A.11.2.7 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-8, MP-6, PE-16
	Information Protection Processes and Procedures (PR.IP)	PR.IP-5: Policy and regulations regarding the physical operating environment for organizational assets are met	CIS CSC 10 COBIT 5 APO13.01, DSS01.01, DSS04.07 ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.3.9 ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.3, SR 7.4 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.3.1, A.17.1.2, A.17.1.3, A.18.1.3 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-4, CP-6, CP-9
	Protective Technology (PR.PT)	PR.PT-1: Audit/log records are determined, documented, implemented, and reviewed in accordance with policy	CIS CSC 1, 3, 5, 6, 14, 15, 16 COBIT 5 APO11.04, BAI03.05, DSS05.04, DSS05.07, MEA02.01 ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4 ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU Family

642 Appendix E Privacy Control Map

643 The following table lists the NIST Privacy Framework Functions, Categories, and Subcategories addressed by this project and maps them to
644 relevant NIST standards, industry standards, and controls and best practices.

645 NOTE: The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standard 27701 references were not mapped by NIST, but by an external
646 organization. They are available at the NIST Privacy Framework Repository [18] and provided here for convenience. The Fair Information
647 Privacy Principles (FIPPS) references are provided to aid understanding of the Privacy Control Map.

648 Table 6-2 Privacy Control Map

Privacy Framework 1.0				Standards and Best Practices
	Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
	IDENTIFY-P (ID-P): Develop the organizational understanding to manage privacy risk for individuals arising from data processing.	Inventory and Mapping (ID.IM-P): Data processing by systems, products, or services is understood and informs the management of privacy risk.	ID.IM-P1: Systems/products/services that process data are inventoried.	FIPPS 7: Purpose Specification/Use Limitation NIST SP 800-37 Rev. 2: Task P-10 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-8 (10), CM-12, CM-13, PM-5 NIST IR 8062 NIST PRAM: Worksheet 2 ISO/IEC 27701:2019 7.2.8, 8.2.6
	CONTROL-P (CT-P): Develop and Optional (Risk Based) appropriate activities to enable organizations or individuals to manage data with sufficient granularity to manage privacy risks.	Data Processing Management (CT.DM-P): Data are managed consistent with the organization's risk strategy to protect individuals' privacy, increase manageability, and enable the implementation of privacy principles (e.g., individual participation, data quality, data minimization).	CT.DM-P8: Audit/log records are determined, documented, and reviewed in accordance with policy and incorporating the principle of data minimization.	FIPPS 4: Minimization NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: AU-1, AU-2, AU-3, AU-6, AU-7, AU-12, AU-13, AU-14, AU-16 NIST IR 8062 ISO/IEC 27701:2019 6.9.4.1, 6.9.4.2, 6.15.1.3

Privacy Framework 1.0				Standards and Best Practices
	Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
		<p>Disassociated Processing (CT.DP-P): Data processing solutions increase disassociability consistent with the organization’s risk strategy to protect individuals’ privacy and enable implementation of privacy principles (e.g., data minimization).</p>	<p>CT.DP-P2: Data are processed to limit the identification of individuals (e.g., de-identification privacy techniques, tokenization).</p>	<p>FIPPS 7: Purpose Specification/Use Limitation NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: AC-23, AU-3(3), IA-4(8), PE-8(3), SA-8(33), SI-12(1), SI-12(2), SI-19 NIST SP 800-63-3 NIST SP 800-188 (draft) NIST IR 8053 NIST IR 8062 ISO/IEC 27701:2019 7.4.2, 7.4.4</p>
		<p>Data Processing Awareness (CM.AW-P): Individuals and organizations have reliable knowledge about data processing practices and associated privacy risks, and effective mechanisms are used and maintained to increase predictability consistent with the organization’s risk strategy to protect individuals’ privacy.</p>	<p>CM.AW-P3: System/product/service design enables data processing visibility.</p>	<p>FIPPS 7: Purpose Specification/Use Limitation NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: PL-8, PT-5(1), SA-17, SC-42(4) NIST IR 8062 ISO/IEC 27701:2019 7.3.2, 7.3.3, 8.3.1</p>
	<p>PROTECT-P (PR-P): Develop and Implement appropriate data processing safeguards.</p>	<p>Data Protection Policies, Processes, and Procedures (PR.PO-P): Security and privacy policies (e.g., purpose, scope, roles and responsibilities in the data processing ecosystem, and</p>	<p>PR.PO-P4: Policy and regulations regarding the physical operating environment for organizational assets are met.</p>	<p>FIPPS 5: Quality and Integrity FIPPS 7: Purpose Specification/Use Limitation NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: PE-1 ISO/IEC 27701:2019 All of 6.8</p>

Privacy Framework 1.0			Standards and Best Practices
Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
	management commitment), processes, and procedures are maintained and used to manage the protection of data.		
	Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control (PR.AC-P): Access to data and devices is limited to authorized individuals, processes, and devices, and is managed consistent with the assessed risk of unauthorized access.	PR.AC-P1: Identities and credentials are issued, managed, verified, revoked, and audited for authorized individuals, processes, and devices.	FIPPS 8: Security NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: IA-1, IA-2, IA-3, IA-4, IA-5, IA-7, IA-8, IA-9, IA-10, IA-11, IA-12 NIST SP 800-63-3 ISO/IEC 27701:2019 6.6.2.1, 6.6.2.2, 6.6.4.2
		PR.AC-P3: Remote access is managed.	FIPPS 8: Security FIPS Publication 199 NIST SP 800-46 Rev. 2 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: AC-1, AC-17, AC-19, AC-20, SC-15 NIST SP 800-77 NIST SP 800-113 NIST SP 800-114 Rev. 1 NIST SP 800-121 Rev. 2 ISO/IEC 27701:2019 6.6.2.1, 6.6.2.2
PR.AC-P4: Access permissions and authorizations are managed, incorporating the principles of least privilege and separation of duties.	FIPPS 8: Security NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: AC-1, AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, AC-14, AC-16, AC-24 NIST SP 800-162		

Privacy Framework 1.0				Standards and Best Practices
	Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
			PR.AC-P5: Network integrity is protected (e.g., network segregation, network segmentation).	FIPPS 8: Security NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: AC-4, AC-10, SC-7, SC-10, SC-20
			PR.AC-P6: Individuals and devices are proofed and bound to credentials and authenticated commensurate with the risk of the transaction (e.g., individuals' security and privacy risks and other organizational risks).	FIPPS 8: Security NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: AC-14, AC-16, IA-1, IA-2, IA-3, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8, IA-9, IA-10, IA-11, IA-12, PE-2, PS-3 NIST SP 800-63-3
		Data Security (PR.DS-P): Data are managed consistent with the organization's risk strategy to protect individuals' privacy and maintain data confidentiality, integrity, and availability.	PR.DS-P1: Data-at-rest are protected.	FIPPS 8: Security NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, MP-8, SC-28 NIST SP 800-175B
			PR.DS-P2: Data-in-transit are protected.	FIPPS 8: Security NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: SC-8, SC-11 NIST SP 800-175B
			PR.DS-P3: Systems/products/services and associated data are formally managed throughout removal, transfers, and disposition.	FIPPS 8: Security NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: CM-8, MP-6, PE-16, PE-20

NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 1800-28C

Data Confidentiality:

Identifying and Protecting Data Against Data Breaches

Volume C:
How-To Guides

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December 2023

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13 National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 1800-28C, Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol.
14 Spec. Publ. 1800-28C, 86 pages, (December 2023), CODEN: NSPUE2

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52 and best practices, and provide users with the materials lists, configuration files, and other information
53 they need to implement a similar approach.

54 The documents in this series describe example implementations of cybersecurity practices that
55 businesses and other organizations may voluntarily adopt. These documents do not describe regulations
56 or mandatory practices, nor do they carry statutory authority.

57 ABSTRACT

58 Attacks that target data are of concern to companies and organizations across many industries. Data
59 breaches represent a threat that can have monetary, reputational, and legal impacts. This guide seeks to
60 provide guidance around the threat of data breaches, exemplifying standards and technologies that are
61 useful for a variety of organizations defending against this threat. Specifically, this guide identifies risks
62 associated with the loss of data confidentiality, and mitigations to protect against those risks.

63 KEYWORDS

64 *asset management; cybersecurity framework; data breach; data confidentiality; data protection;*
65 *identify; malicious actor; malware; protect; ransomware*

66 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

67 We are grateful to the following individuals for their generous contributions of expertise and time.

Name	Organization
Jason Winder	Avrio Software (now known as Aerstone)
Trey Doré	Cisco
Matthew Hyatt	Cisco
Randy Martin	Cisco
Peter Romness	Cisco
Bryan Rosensteel	Cisco
Micah Wilson	Cisco
Ben Burke	Dispel
Fred Chang	Dispel
Matt Fulk	Dispel
Ian Schmertzler	Dispel
Kenneth Durbin	FireEye
Tom Los	FireEye
J.R. Wikes	FireEye
Jennifer Cawthra	NIST
Joe Faxlanger	PKWARE
Victor Ortiz	PKWARE
Jim Wyne	PKWARE
Steve Petruzzo	Qcor

Name	Organization
Billy Stewart	Qcor
Norman Field	StrongKey
Patrick Leung	StrongKey
Arshad Noor	StrongKey
Dylan Buel	Symantec, a division of Broadcom
Sunjeet Randhawa	Symantec, a division of Broadcom
Paul Swinton	Symantec, a division of Broadcom
Spike Dog	The MITRE Corporation
Sallie Edwards	The MITRE Corporation
Brian Johnson	The MITRE Corporation
Lauren Lusty	The MITRE Corporation
Karri Meldorf	The MITRE Corporation
Julie Snyder	The MITRE Corporation
Lauren Swan	The MITRE Corporation
Anne Townsend	The MITRE Corporation
Jessica Walton	The MITRE Corporation

68 The Technology Partners/Collaborators who participated in this build submitted their capabilities in
69 response to a notice in the Federal Register. Respondents with relevant capabilities or product
70 components were invited to sign a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) with
71 NIST, allowing them to participate in a consortium to build this example solution. We worked with:

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156 1 Introduction

157 The following volumes of this guide show information technology (IT) professionals and security
158 engineers how we implemented this example solution. We cover all of the products employed in this
159 reference design. We do not re-create the product manufacturers' documentation, which is presumed
160 to be widely available. Rather, these volumes show how we incorporated the products together in our
161 lab environment.

162 *Note: These are not comprehensive tutorials. There are many possible service and security configurations*
163 *for these products that are out of scope for this reference design.*

164 1.1 How to Use this Guide

165 This National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Practice Guide demonstrates a
166 standards-based reference design and provides users with the information they need to replicate the
167 ability to identify threats to and protect from a loss of data confidentiality. This reference design is
168 modular and can be deployed in whole or in part.

169 This guide contains three volumes:

- 170 ▪ NIST SP 1800-28A: *Executive Summary*
- 171 ▪ NIST SP 1800-28B: *Approach, Architecture, and Security Characteristics* – what we built and why
- 172 ▪ NIST SP 1800-28C: *How-To Guides* – instructions for building the example solution (**you are**
173 **here**)

174 Depending on your role in your organization, you might use this guide in different ways:

175 **Business decision makers, including chief security and technology officers**, will be interested in the
176 *Executive Summary, NIST SP 1800-28A*, which describes the following topics:

- 177 ▪ challenges that enterprises face in identifying vulnerable assets and protecting them from data
178 breaches
- 179 ▪ example solution built at the NCCoE
- 180 ▪ benefits of adopting the example solution

181 **Technology or security program managers** who are concerned with how to identify, understand, assess,
182 and mitigate risk will be interested in *NIST SP 1800-28B*, which describes what we did and why. The
183 following sections will be of particular interest:

- 184 ▪ Section 3.4.1, Risk, describes the risk analysis we performed.
- 185 ▪ Appendix D, Security Control Map, maps the security characteristics of this example solution to
186 cybersecurity standards and best practices.

187 You might share the *Executive Summary, NIST SP 1800-28A*, with your leadership team members to help
188 them understand the importance of adopting a standards-based solution to identify threats to and
189 protect from a loss of data confidentiality

190 **IT professionals** who want to implement an approach like this will find this whole practice guide useful.
191 You can use this How-To portion of the guide, *NIST SP 1800-28C*, to replicate all or parts of the build
192 created in our lab. This How-To portion of the guide provides specific product installation, configuration,
193 and integration instructions for implementing the example solution. We do not recreate the product
194 manufacturers' documentation, which is generally widely available. Rather, we show how we
195 incorporated the products together in our environment to create an example solution.

196 This guide assumes that IT professionals have experience implementing security products within the
197 enterprise. While we have used a suite of commercial products to address this challenge, this guide does
198 not endorse these particular products. Your organization can adopt this solution or one that adheres to
199 these guidelines in whole, or you can use this guide as a starting point for tailoring and implementing
200 parts of a solution to identify threats to and protect from a loss of data confidentiality. Your
201 organization's security experts should identify the products that will best integrate with your existing
202 tools and IT system infrastructure. We hope that you will seek products that are congruent with
203 applicable standards and best practices. Section 3.6 Technologies, lists the products that we used and
204 maps them to the cybersecurity controls provided by this reference solution.

205 A NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide does not describe "the" solution, but a possible solution. This is a
206 draft guide. We seek feedback on its contents and welcome your input. Comments, suggestions, and
207 success stories will improve subsequent versions of this guide. Please contribute your thoughts to [ds-](mailto:ds-nccoe@nist.gov)
208 [nccoe@nist.gov](mailto:ds-nccoe@nist.gov) .

209 **1.2 Build Overview**

210 The NCCoE built a hybrid virtual-physical laboratory environment to explore methods to effectively
211 identify sensitive data and protect against a loss of data confidentiality in various Information
212 Technology (IT) enterprise environments. This work also highlights standards and technologies that are
213 useful for a variety of organizations defending against this threat. The servers in the virtual environment
214 were built to the hardware specifications of their specific software components.

215 The NCCoE worked with members of the Data Confidentiality Community of Interest to develop a
216 diverse (but non-comprehensive) set of security scenarios against which to test the reference
217 implementation. These are detailed in Volume B, Section 5.2.


218 1.3 Typographic Conventions

219 The following table presents typographic conventions used in this volume.

Typeface/Symbol	Meaning	Example
<i>Italics</i>	file names and path names; references to documents that are not hyperlinks; new terms; and placeholders	For language use and style guidance, see the <i>NCCoE Style Guide</i> .
Bold	names of menus, options, command buttons, and fields	Choose File > Edit .
Monospace	command-line input, onscreen computer output, sample code examples, and status codes	<code>mkdir</code>
Monospace Bold	command-line user input contrasted with computer output	<code>service sshd start</code>
blue text	link to other parts of the document, a web URL, or an email address	All publications from NIST's NCCoE are available at https://www.nccoe.nist.gov .

220 1.4 Logical Architecture Summary

221 The architecture described is built within the NCCoE lab environment. Organizations will need to
 222 consider how the technologies in this architecture will align technologies their existing infrastructure. In
 223 addition to network management resources, such as a border firewall, the architecture assumes the
 224 presence of user workstations, an active directory system, and databases. The diagram below shows the
 225 components of the architecture and how they interact with enterprise resources.



- 226 • **Data Management (Avrio)** allows discovery and tracking of files throughout the enterprise.
- 227 • **Data Protection (GreenTec, StrongKey, PKWARE)** involves encryption and protection against
- 228 disclosure of sensitive files.
- 229 • **User Access Controls (Cisco Duo)** allows organizations to enforce access control policies,
- 230 ensuring that only authorized users have access to sensitive files.
- 231 • **Browser Isolation (Symantec SWG)** protects endpoints in the organization from malicious
- 232 web-based threats by utilizing multi-layered content inspection to block threats and remote
- 233 isolation of content from high-risk and unknown sites.
- 234 • **Policy Enforcement (Cisco Duo)** ensures that endpoints in the organization conform to specified
- 235 security policies, which can include certificate verification, installed programs, and machine
- 236 posture.
- 237 • **Security Information and Event Management (FireEye Helix)** creates a baseline of a normal
- 238 enterprise activity for comparison in the event of a data confidentiality event. This function
- 239 includes the collection, aggregation, and analysis of logs throughout the enterprise, including
- 240 logs from other security tools, to provide a better picture of the overall health of the enterprise
- 241 before a breach should occur.
- 242 • **Network Protection (Dispel)** ensures that hosts on the network only communicate in allowed
- 243 ways, preventing side-channel attacks and attacks that rely on direct communication between
- 244 hosts. Furthermore, it protects against potentially malicious hosts joining or observing traffic
- 245 (encrypted or decrypted) traversing the network.

246 For a more detailed description of our architecture, see Volume B, Section 4.

247 **2 Product Installation Guides**

248 This section of the practice guide contains detailed instructions for installing and configuring all of the
249 products used to build an instance of the example solution. This implementation guide is split into
250 sections for each product and integrations between these products, aiming to present a modular
251 architecture where individual capabilities and products can be swapped out or excluded depending on
252 the needs of the organization. Organizations can choose to implement a partial architecture based on
253 their own risk assessments and data protection requirements.


254 **2.1 FireEye Helix**

255 FireEye Helix is a security incident and event management system used for collecting and managing logs
256 from various sources. In this build, Helix is primarily used to manage events and alerts generated by data
257 collected from across the enterprise. This build implemented a cloud deployment of Helix, and as such,
258 much of the documentation provided will be integrating a cloud deployment with various products and
259 components of the enterprise.


260 In this setup, we detail the installation of a communications broker which will be used to collect logs
261 from the enterprise and forward them to the cloud deployment. This installation took place on a CentOS
262 7 Virtual Machine.

263 **Installing the Communications Broker- CentOS 7**

- 264 1. Acquire the Helix Communications Broker for CentOS 7.
- 265 2. Navigate to the folder containing the installer, and run
266 > `sudo yum localinstall ./cbs-installer_1.4.2-9.x86_64.rpm`
- 267 3. Log on to the Helix web console.
- 268 4. Navigate to **Dashboards > Operational**.
- 269 5. Click **Download Certificate**.
- 270 6. Click **Download**. This will download a “bootstrap.zip” file.
- 271 7. Copy the zip file to the Helix Communications Broker certificate directory.
272 > `sudo cp bootstrap.zip /opt/tap-nxlog/cert`
- 273 8. Navigate to the certificate directory.
274 > `cd /opt/tap-nxlog/cert`
- 275 9. Extract the zip file you just copied.
276 > `sudo unzip ./bootstrap.zip`
- 277 10. If prompted, select “Yes” to overwrite any previous certificate files.
- 278 11. Navigate to one folder above.
279 > `sudo cd ..`
- 280 12. Run the setup script.
281 > `sudo ./setup.sh`
- 282 13. Enter the name of the CentOS machine.
- 283 14. Enter the receiver URL provided in the Helix welcome email.



- 284 15. Select **Add Routes** and press **Enter**.
- 285 16. Select **syslog**.
- 286 17. Select **tcp**.
- 287 18. Select the IP address of the machine where logs should be sent.
- 288 19. Enter 512 for the port number where logs should be sent.




- 289 20. Select **OK** and press **Enter**.
- 290 21. Review the configuration, then select **OK** and press **Enter**.

291 Forwarding Event Logs from Windows 2012 R2


- 292 22. Acquire **nxlog-ce-2.10.2150.msi** from [http://nxlog.org/products/nxlog-community-](http://nxlog.org/products/nxlog-community-edition/download)
- 293 [edition/download](http://nxlog.org/products/nxlog-community-edition/download).
- 294 23. Run **nxlog-ce-2.10.2150.msi**.




- 295 24. Click **Next**.
- 296 25. Check the box next to **I accept the terms in the License Agreement**.




- 297 26. Click **Next**.



- 298 27. Click **Next**.



299 28. Click **Install**.



300 29. Click **Finish**.

301 30. Navigate to *C:\Program Files (x86)\nxlog\conf* and open **nxlog.conf**.

302 31. Copy the **nxlog.conf** file provided below.

```

Panic Soft
#NoFreeOnExit TRUE

define ROOT      C:\Program Files (x86)\nxlog
define CERTDIR   %ROOT%\cert
define CONFDIR   %ROOT%\conf
define LOGDIR    %ROOT%\data
define LOGFILE   %LOGDIR%\nxlog.log
LogFile %LOGFILE%

Moduledir %ROOT%\modules
CacheDir  %ROOT%\data
Pidfile   %ROOT%\data\nxlog.pid
SpoolDir  %ROOT%\data

<Extension _syslog>
  Module xm_syslog
</Extension>

<Input in>
  Module im_msvistalog
# For windows 2003 and earlier use the following:
# Module im_mseventlog
</Input>

<Output out>
  Module om_tcp
  Host 192.168.1.206
  Port 512
  Exec to_syslog_snare();
</Output>

<Route 1>
  Path in => out
</Route>

```

- 303 32. Restart the **nxlog** service.
- 304 33. You can verify that this connection is working by checking the logs in *data\nxlog.log*, and by
- 305 noting an increase in events on the Helix Dashboard.

306 2.2 Symantec Cloud Secure Web Gateway

307 This installation and configuration guide for Symantec SWG uses a cloud instance of Web Isolation. In

308 this guide, Web Isolation is used to isolate threats to the user through the browser. It does this through

309 the use of a web proxy, which captures traffic and assigns a threat level to it, and based on


310 administrative policy decides whether to serve the page to the user. In doing so, threats from the web

311 can be mitigated through shared intelligence and isolated execution of the page before it reaches the


312 user's desktop.

313 Configure Web Security Service


- 314 1. Login to the Symantec portal by navigating to <https://portal.threatpulse.com/>.



- 315 2. Click **Configure** next to Protection Suite.
- 316 3. Select **WSS Portal**.
- 317 4. Select **Monitor**.




- 318 5. Click **Next**.
- 319 6. Select **Suppress User/Group, Device Info, Client IP, Geolocation**. (Note: If you are planning to
- 320 use this tool for network monitoring of organizational users, a less strict privacy policy may be
- 321 preferable; however, for this build, we are using Web Isolation primarily for external threats.)




322 7. Click **Next**.


323 8. Indicate whether you have mobile users.




324 9. Click **Next**. Indicate whether your users connect from a static location.




325 10. Click **Next**. Indicate whether you want to configure an Auth Connector.



326 11. Click **Next**.




327 12. Click **Go To Product Setup**.




328 13. Click **Continue**.

329 Install Proxy Certificates and enabling TLS/SSL Interception


330 1. Click the **Policy** tab.




- 331 2. Click **TLS/SSL Interception**.
- 332 3. Enable TLS/SSL interception by clicking the toggle.




- 333 4. Download the certificate here. You can either install this individually in the Trusted Root
- 334 Certification Authorities store on individual machines or follow the below steps to distribute the
- 335 certificate via Group Policy.
- 336 5. Open the **Group Policy Management Console**.
- 337 6. Right click the **Domain** and select **Create a GPO in this domain, and Link it here....**




- 338 7. Enter a name and click **OK**.
- 339 8. Right click the newly created GPO and click **Edit...**




- 340 9. Navigate to **Computer Configuration > Policies > Window Settings > Security Settings > Public**
- 341 **Key Policies**, and right click **Trusted Root Certification Authorities**.
- 342 10. Click **Import**.
- 343 11. Click **Next**.
- 344 12. Select the certificate you just downloaded.



345 13. Click **Next**.



346 14. Click **Next**.




347 15. Click **Finish**.


348 16. Click **OK**.

349 Configure Symantec Web Security Service Proxy


350 1. Navigate to the **Connectivity** tab.




351 2. Click **Locations**.




- 352 3. Click **Add Location**.
- 353 4. Enter a name for the **Location**.
- 354 5. Select **Proxy Forwarding** for **Access Method**.
- 355 6. Enter any public IP addresses of your organization, to ensure that traffic sent through the WSS
- 356 proxy is redirected to the proper dashboard.




- 357 7. Click **Save**.
- 358 8. This page will now provide a URL to a PAC file which can be distributed to browsers across the
- 359 organization via GPO. If you wish to create a custom PAC file, you can navigate to **Connectivity >**
- 360 **PAC Files**.
- 361 9. Open the **Group Policy Management Console**.




362 10. Right click the **Domain** and select **Create a GPO in this domain, and Link it here...**




363 11. Enter a name and click **OK**.




- 364 12. Right click the newly created GPO and click **Edit...**
- 365 13. Navigate to **User Configuration > Preferences > Control Panel Settings**.



- 366 14. Right click **Internet Settings** and select **New > Internet Explorer 10 Properties**.
- 367 15. Click the **Connections** Tab.




368 16. Click **Local Area Network (LAN Settings)**.




369 17. Select the **Address** field.

370 18. Press **F6** to enable it (it is enabled if the box has a solid green underline).

371 19. Enter the PAC file URL from earlier in the **Address** field.




372 20. Click **OK**.



373 21. Click **OK**.

374 22. To verify that traffic is going through Isolation, you can visit the following test website, and
375 substitute 1-10 for the threat level: <http://testrating.webfilter.bluecoat.com/threatrisk/level/7>.




376 23. On this test URL (tested July 2022), levels 5-7 will go through isolation, and you will be able to
 377 see the isolation traffic from the network tab in developer mode (F12) on the browser. Levels 8-
 378 10 will be blocked by the content filter, and levels 1-4 will not go through isolation or content
 379 filtering.

380 2.3 PKWARE PKProtect


381 This installation and configuration guide for PKWARE PKProtect uses a physical PKWARE server, and as
 382 such will not delve into the installation of server components. In this guide, PKWARE is used to
 383 automatically perform data inventory and data protection functions. PKWARE provides users with the
 384 ability to store encrypted files for retrieval later, requiring the use of user credentials to access them.

385 Configure PKWARE with Active Directory


- 386 1. Login to the PKWARE web portal using the administrative credentials.



- 387 2. Once logged in, you can and should change the password to this administrative account by
388 clicking **Change Password** in the top right corner.
389 3. Navigate to **System > Domain**.




- 390 4. Click **Join Domain**.
- 391 5. Enter the **Kerberos Realm, NetBIOS Domain**, as well as the **username** and **password** of an
- 392 administrative user on the domain.



- 393 6. Click **Join Domain**.


394 Create a New Administrative User

- 395 1. Navigate to **Advanced > Admins**.



- 396 2. Click **Add Domain User**.
- 397 3. Enter the username of a user on the domain that should be able to login through the PKWARE
- 398 management portal (this is meant for administrators only).


- 399 4. Select the level of permissions the user should have.



- 400 5. Click **Save**.

401 Install Prerequisites

- 402 1. If needed for your environment, you may need to install certificates locally before agents can
403 connect to PKProtect - ask your PKWARE representative if this is necessary for your
404 environment.
405 2. Double click the certificate you wish to install.




- 406 3. Click **Install Certificate....**
407 4. Select **Current User**.




- 408 5. Click **Next**.
- 409 6. Click **Browse**.
- 410 7. Select **Trusted Root Certification Authorities**.




- 411 8. Click **Next**.




- 412 9. Click **Finish**.




- 413 10. Click **OK**.
- 414 11. Repeat steps 1 through 10 but select **Personal** instead of **Trusted Root Certification Authorities**.
- 415 12. Repeat steps 1 through 11 for each certificate which needs to be installed.



- 416 13. Rename agent-registry.txt to agent-registry.reg.
- 417 14. Double click the file (must have administrator privileges).




- 418 15. Click **Yes**.




- 419 16. Click **OK**.
- 420 17. Restart the machine to apply these changes.

421 Install the PKProtect Agent


- 422 1. Run the PKProtect Installation executable.




- 423 2. Click **Next**.
- 424 3. Select **I accept the terms in the license agreement**.




- 425 4. Click **Next**.
- 426 5. Select **Typical**.




427 6. Click **Next**.



428 7. Click **Install**.




429 8. Click **Finish**.



430 9. If a window to login is not automatically shown, you can right click the PKProtect icon in the
 431 Windows taskbar and click **Login....** If a window is automatically shown, click **Log in**.

432 10. Login using the username of the account in the domain, in email format (such as
 433 administrator@domain.id).




434 11. Enter the address of the PKWARE server.

435 12. The PKWARE agent will now run in the background.

436 Configure Discovery and Reporting


437 1. On the PKWARE dashboard, log in as an administrative user, and navigate to **Archive >**
 438 **Discovery**.




439 2. Click **Add Discovery**.

440 3. Enter a **name** for the discovery rule.


- 441 4. Select a **pattern** for the rule to discover. In this case, we are setting up a rule to detect social
- 442 security numbers in files for reporting/remediation.
- 443 5. The **Threshold** field refers to how many of those patterns must be present in a document for the
- 444 rule to be applied.




- 445 6. Click **Save**.
- 446 7. Navigate to **Archive > Remediations**.




- 447 8. Click **Add**.
- 448 9. Enter a name for the remediation.




- 449 10. Check the box next to **Report Discovery Events**.
- 450 11. Check the box next to **Encrypt**.
- 451 12. Ensure that **AES (256-bit)** is selected.
- 452 13. Click **Save**.




- 453 14. Navigate to **Archive > Assignments**.




454 15. Click **Add**.



- 455 16. Enter a **name** for the Assignment.
- 456 17. Select the **Platform** for this assignment to run on.
- 457 18. Select **Discovery** for the **Mode**.
- 458 19. Enter the names of the Active Directory users or groups this rule should apply to.
- 459 20. Enter the folders for this rule to search in **Local Paths**.
- 460 21. Use **Whitelist** and **Blacklist** to specify file types which should or should not be considered.
- 461 22. Enter the interval for this rule to run in **Sweep Interval**.



- 462 23. Under **Remediation Actions**, click **Add**.
- 463 24. Select the **Discovery** rule created earlier under **Smart Filter Bundles**.
- 464 25. Select the **Remediation Action** created earlier under **Remediation Action**.



- 465 26. Click **Save**.
- 466 27. This rule will now run automatically, reporting and encrypting files which match its discovery
- 467 conditions.

468 2.4 StrongKey Tellaro

469 StrongKey is a REST API providing various security services. In this project, we primarily make use of its
 470 file encryption capabilities in the context of data protection. Because it is a web service, there is not
 471 much installation required on the enterprise side, and the bulk of the setup is acquiring credentials to
 472 communicate safely with the API. In this build, Strongkey will primarily be used for integration with
 473 other products, to encrypt sensitive data generated by products in formats which may be otherwise
 474 difficult to encrypt.

475

476 Python Client for StrongKey – Windows Executable Creation and Use

- 477 1. Ensure that the following script (see end of section) is filled out with information specific to your
478 enterprise, including the variables **skdid**, **skuser**, and **skpass**.
- 479 2. Save the file as **strongkey-client.py**.
- 480 3. This example will demonstrate how to create an executable from the script below. Download
481 Python 3.8.0 from the Python website: <https://www.python.org/downloads/release/python-380/>. Specifically, download the **Windows x86 executable installer**. The 32-bit version will
482 provide better access to Active Directory packages and interfaces.
- 483
- 484 4. Run the installer.
- 485 5. Check the box next to **Add Python 3.8 to PATH**.



- 486 6. Click **Install Now**.



- 487 7. Click **Close**.
- 488 8. Open a PowerShell window.
- 489 9. Run the following command to install **pyinstaller**.
- 490 `> pip install pyinstaller`
- 491 10. Run the following command to install **requests**.
- 492 `> pip install requests`
- 493 11. From the PowerShell window, navigate to where you saved strongkey-client.py.
- 494 12. Run the following command to build the client into an executable.
- 495 `> pyinstaller --onefile .\strongkey-client.py`
- 496 13. A folder called **dist** will be created. In this folder will be an executable named strongkey-
- 497 client.exe.
- 498 14. To encrypt a file in place (i.e., overwrite the file with encrypted contents), run the following
- 499 command:
- 500 `> ./strongkey-client.exe -encrypt -overwrite --infile`
- 501 sensitive.txt
- 502 15. To encrypt a file and save it to a new location, run the following command:
- 503 `> ./strongkey-client.exe -encrypt --outfile encrypted.txt --`
- 504 infile sensitive.txt
- 505 16. To decrypt a file in place (i.e., overwrite the encrypted file with plaintext contents), run the
- 506 following command:
- 507 `> ./strongkey-client.exe -decrypt -overwrite --infile`
- 508 sensitive.txt

509 17. To decrypt a file and save it to a new location, run the following command:

```
510 > ./strongkey-client.exe -decrypt --outfile decrypted.txt --
511 infile encrypted.txt
```

512 18. This client can be configured to run on a schedule, or be iterated over a directory of files,
513 depending on the needs of the organization. Because the client is Python and StrongKey is REST
514 API based, the script is adaptable to various architectures and can be deployed widely across the
515 enterprises, to fill in gaps that the enterprise may have in its data protection capabilities.

```
516 import requests
517 import json
518 import argparse
519
520 skdid = # Note: Users should reference a separate file for this ID
521 skuser = # Note: Users should reference a separate file for the username
522 skpass = # Note: Users should reference a separate file for the password
523 encurl = "https://demo4.strongkey.com/skee/rest/encrypt"
524 decurl = "https://demo4.strongkey.com/skee/rest/decrypt"
525
526 def buildrequest(fname, encrypt):
527     req = {}
528     req["svcinfol"] = {
529         "did": skdid,
530         "svcusername": skuser,
531         "svcpassword": skpass
532     }
533
534     if (encrypt):
535         req["encinfo"] = {
536             "algorithm": "AES",
537             "keysize": 256,
538             "uniquekey": True
539         }
540
541     req["fileinfo"] = {
542         "filename": name
543     }
544
545     req["authzinfo"] = {
546         "username": "encryptdecrypt",
547         #"userdn": "cn=encryptdecrypt,did="+skdid+",ou=us-
548 ers,ou=v2,ou=SKCE,ou=StrongAuth,ou=Applications,dc=strongauth,dc=com",
549         "authgroups": "cn=EncryptionAuthor-
550 ized,did="+skdid+",ou=groups,ou=v2,ou=SKCE,ou=Applica-
551 tions,dc=strongauth,dc=com",
552         "requiredauthorization": 0
553     }
554
555     req["svcinfol"] = json.dumps(req["svcinfol"])
556     req["fileinfo"] = json.dumps(req["fileinfo"])
557     if (encrypt):
558         req["encinfo"] = json.dumps(req["encinfo"])
559         req["authzinfo"] = json.dumps(req["authzinfo"])
560
561
```

```

562     return req
563
564     def encrypt(filename,output,overwrite):
565         req = buildrequest(filename, True)
566         with open(filename, mode='rb') as f:
567             files = [('filedata', f)]
568             p = requests.request("POST", encurl, headers={}, data=req,
569 files=files)
570             print(p)
571             p.raise_for_status()
572             if (p.status_code == 200):
573                 output = filename if overwrite else output
574                 with open(output, mode='wb') as o:
575                     o.write(p.content)
576
577         def decrypt(filename,out,overwrite):
578             req = buildrequest(filename, False)
579             with open(filename, mode='rb') as f:
580                 files = [('filedata', f)]
581                 p = requests.request("POST", decurl, headers={}, data=req,
582 files=files)
583                 p.raise_for_status()
584                 if (p.status_code == 200):
585                     output = filename if overwrite else out
586                     with open(output, mode='wb') as o:
587                         o.write(p.content)
588
589
590     parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='Encrypt or decrypt a file
591 using Strongkey.')
592
593     group = parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group(required=True)
594     group.add_argument("-encrypt", action='store_true')
595     group.add_argument("-decrypt", action='store_true')
596
597     group = parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group(required=True)
598     group.add_argument("-overwrite", action='store_true')
599     group.add_argument("--outfile", type=str)
600
601     parser.add_argument("--infile", type=str, required=True)
602
603     a = parser.parse_args()
604
605     if (a.overwrite is True):
606         overwrite = True
607         out = ""
608     elif (a.outfile is not None):
609         out = a.outfile
610         overwrite = False
611
612     if (a.encrypt is True):
613         encrypt(a.infile, out, overwrite)
614     elif (a.decrypt is True):
615         decrypt(a.infile, out, overwrite)


```

616 2.5 Qcor ForceField

617 ForceField is a Write-Protected File System (WFS) combining hardware device security and encryption.
 618 In this build, ForceField is primarily used to backup data while maintaining confidentiality through
 619 encryption. In this build, we used ForceField is for the protection of a transactional database which
 620 needs to maintain both the confidentiality and integrity of prior transactions, while still affording the
 621 ability to use that data in new transactions.

622 Installation and Usage of ForceField

- 623 1. Either a CD or zip file will be provided by Qcor containing the WFS API and associate utilities.
 624 Copy the contents of `\GreenTec\Release` onto the C: drive of the Qcor ForceField server.
- 625 2. Add the destination folder to the command line PATH variable if necessary. To do this, from the
 626 start menu search for **Environment Variables**.



- 627 3. Double click the **Path** variable and add the path to the WFS API.

```

Administrator: Command Prompt
C:\Users\Administrator.DC>wfsdir 2

*
-----*
ForceField(tm) Directory List for Write-Protected File System (WFS) Version 1.9
h, Apr 9 2022 at 20:48:29
Copyright (C) 2020-2021. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed to GreenTec-USA, Inc.

Note: Must be executed with elevated permissions (e.g. admin (Windows) or root
(Linux))

ST_Parms: * Warning * Unable to locate wfs.conf file, taking default parms

ForceField(tm) ---> *** HARDWARE-ENFORCED DATA SECURITY *** ACTIVE ON THIS W
FS VOLUME <---

*
-----*

* SerialNum S2ZWJ9JG300194 has NOT been Finalized
* SerialNum S2ZWJ9JG300194 has BEEN ENFORCED from 99904 to 100095, MaxLBA=19535
25167
* Disk has been Enforced or Finalized, DO NOT ATTEMPT TO RE-FORMAT. Cannot re-
format this disk.

STVerify: *** Fix (-fix) Option NOT Specified. Any potential corrections will no
t be applied.
DBVerify: DirBlks VERIFIED OK. Searched: 4 Files, 11 Extensions, DirBlks avail
able 12482

  CrDate   CrTime   FileSize   Blocks   Start   End   Dir
  Ver   Ext  FILENAME
-----
20210520 14:59:08    213      8    100008    100015  99984
  1      *
20210520 14:59:46    213      8    100016    100023  99976
  1      *
20210630 12:16:20     26      8    100024    100031  99968
  1      *
20221017 12:52:14    242      8    100032    100039  99960
  1      *
20221017 12:56:23    242      8    100040    100047  99952
  1      *
20221017 12:58:47    157      8    100048    100055  99944
  1      *
20221026 11:42:00    157      8    100056    100063  99936
  1      *
20221116 12:20:26    157      8    100064    100071  99928
  1      *
20221116 12:21:41    157      8    100072    100079  99920
  1      *
20221116 12:22:01    157      8    100080    100087  99912
  1      *
20221116 12:26:30    157      8    100088    100095  99904
  1      *
  1      *
-----

USAGE STATISTICS: Num Extents= 11, Total Disk Size=1.0002 (TB), Used=0.0001 (
TB), Remaining=1.0002 (TB)
Drive 2
  DATA:          TB          Blocks      Percent
-----
  USED : 0.00000          88      0.00000
  AVAIL: 1.00015     1953425039     100.00000
  TOTAL: 1.00015     1953425127

  DIRBLKS:        GB          Blocks      Percent
-----
  USED : 0.00001          11      0.00005
  AVAIL: 0.00639     12482      99.91195
  TOTAL: 0.00640     12493
  
```

- 628 4. Verify that the drives of the Qcor WFS server have been formatted to work with ForceField with
629 wfsdir command line utility that was just installed. The drives may be pre-formatted. Use the

630 following command to determine whether a drive is formatted. In place of “N”, enter the
631 number of the drive to check.

632

633 > **wfsdir N**

634

635 5. *If the hard drive(s) have not been formatted*, use the wfsx command line tool to format your
636 drive. **Note:** Once performed, the formatting cannot be undone. The following instructions are
637 copied from the WFS User Guide.

638

639 > **wfsfx <devicename> <options>**

640

641 **devicename** is the device identifier of the disk to be formatted.
642 For Windows, this is the Windows disk number that may be found
643 via the Windows Disk Manager (e.g. 1, 2, etc.). For Linux, this
644 is the physical device name (e.g. /dev/sdb/).

645

646 **options** may be:

647 **-DirX** or **-x** <power of 10> (optional power of 10 for max number
648 of files, default is 10)

649 1 will format for 1,243 files, 10 will allow 12,489 files, 100
650 allows 124,993 files, 1000 allows 1,249,930 files

651 **-vuser** <username> specifies a volume user name, DO NOT FORGET
652 THIS USE NAME IF USED!

653 **-vpass** <password> specifies a volume password, DO NOT FORGET
654 THIS PASSWORD IF USED!

655 **-cache** ON|OFF will turn on or off the disk drive internal
656 cache (default is ON).

657 **-verifywrite** ON|OFF will turn write verify on or off for the
658 WFS volume (default is OFF). The write verify status may be
659 toggled ON or OFF using the WFScache utility. **NOTE:** turning write
660 verify ON may significantly degrade I/O performance.

661

662 6. Files can then be copied into or out of the designated drives using the wfs copy command line
663 tool. The following instructions are copied from the WFS User Guide.

664 > **wfscopy <source-file> <destination-file> <count>**

665 One of the files must be a native OS file system file, and the other file must be a WFS file. **source-file** is
666 the name of the input file and may be a native OS filename, or a WFS filename. **destination-file** is the
667 name of the input file and may be a native OS filename, or a WFS filename. **count** is the optional num-
668 ber of bytes to copied. count defaults to all records.

669 **Examples of wfscopy using Windows:**

```
670 > wfscopy testfile.txt 1:*
```

671 The above command will copy the file named testfile.txt from the local directory to disk number 1 with
672 the same name. If the WFS file does not previously exist, then it is created. If the WFS file does
673 previously exist, then the data is appended to the existing WFS file as a new file extension.

```
674 > wfscopy 2:Contracts.pdf c:\myfolder\Contracts.pdf
```

675 The above command will copy all records from all extensions of the WFS file named Contract.pdf from
676 the disk, as identified as 2 by the Windows Disk Manager, to the Windows file C:\myfolder\Contracts.pdf
677 record by record.

```
678 > wfscopy 4:myfile.txt con:
```


679 The above command will display the contents of the WFS file myfile.txt from disk 4 onto the console.
680 This is similar to using the type command in the Windows command line.

681 **2.6 Avrio SIFT**


682 Avrio SIFT is a data inventory and management capability designed to enforce data policies. The
683 installation of Avrio SIFT is typically done in a managed fashion by the vendor, and the deployment seen
684 in the NCCoE lab may not resemble other deployments. In the case of a Docker deployment,
685 configuration to the base Avrio installation can be made by modifying the docker-compose file.
686 Otherwise, it will be assumed that Avrio has been installed and configured properly for the enterprise by
687 the vendor.

688 **Configuring Avrio SIFT**


- 689 1. Navigate to the SIFT dashboard (default address: <http://IP-address:8080/sift/>) and login.
- 690 2. Click **Configuration**.
- 691 3. Under **Enclaves**, enter two locations. First, the path to the public Windows share, and second,
692 the path to the one protected by PKProtect. We will use this second path later in the integration
693 between PKProtect and SIFT. In this example, DCIPDRR is the path to the public share, and
694 PROTECTED is the path to the one protected by PKProtect. Enter user accounts that can access
695 each share. In production, it is recommended to create a separate user account for SIFT to use
696 to access these shares.




- 697 4. Click **Save Changes**.
- 698 5. Click **Keywords** on the left menu.
- 699 6. Click **Add new keyword**.
- 700 7. Enter the keyword under **Name**, and an **Alias** (if desired). Check the box next to any enclaves
- 701 which are allowed to have this keyword – SIFT will be able to move files matching it to the
- 702 enclaves you check the box for.
- 703 8. Select the PROTECTED enclave under **Move To**.



- 704 9. Click **Save Changes**.
- 705 10. Click **File Types**.
- 706 11. Designate file types which are allowed to exist under each enclave.



- 707 12. Click **Save Changes**.
- 708 13. Click **Classifications**.
- 709 14. Designate the classifications which are allowed to exist under each enclave.



- 710 15. Click **Save Changes**.
- 711 16. On the top click **Request > New Request**.
- 712 17. Click **Batch**.
- 713 18. Select **UNC Path** for **Source Type**.
- 714 19. Select the enclave to scan for sensitive files.
- 715 20. Select **Move** for **Scan Type**. (Note that if you select **Scan** for **Scan Type**, it will scan files and tell you they are sensitive and whether they can be moved, but will not attempt to move them. This is useful for debugging.)
- 716
- 717
- 718 21. Select **Delete** for **Move Action**, or another action depending on the needs of your organization.
- 719 Selecting **Delete** will remove the sensitive file from the public share and move it to the
- 720 protected one.

- 721 22. Set **Scan Subfolders** to **ON**.
- 722 23. Enter a **description** for the scan.
- 723 24. Set the frequency of the scan. Note that the efficiency of the scan will likely depend on the size
- 724 of the organization, and it may be more desirable to scan once an hour rather than once a
- 725 minute.

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the SIFT interface. The page title is 'SIFT | Secure Integrated File Tagging'. The browser address bar shows '192.168.1.198:8080/sift/batch/create'. The interface has a navigation menu with 'Request', 'Configuration', 'Reports', 'Analyze', and 'Access'. The user is logged in as 'User, Admin'. On the left, there is a 'New Request Type' sidebar with options: File, Batch (selected), and Rescan. The main area is titled 'Initiate Batch Request' and contains the following form fields:

- Source Type: UNC Path
- Source Enclave: DCIPDRR
- Scan Type: Move
- Move Action: Delete
- Scan Subfolders: ON (toggle)
- Description*: Move Files
- Scheduled Time: Every minute
- 0 0/1 * * * ?

A green 'SUBMIT' button is located at the bottom of the form.

- 726 25. Click **Submit**.
- 727 26. Now, you can verify that files which are added to the public share with sensitive keywords are
- 728 moved to the share designed to hold sensitive files.

729 2.7 Cisco Duo

730 Cisco Duo is a Multi-Factor Authentication and Single Sign-On tool. In this project, Dispel is used to

731 control access to internal systems through virtualization, and Duo is used as a multifactor authentication

732 solution between Dispel and those internal systems. This ensures that even if a Dispel virtual machine

733 becomes compromised, there is still significant access control between that machine and the internal


734 enterprise machines.

735 In the following section, we demonstrate the installation of Cisco Duo on an internal system in such a


736 way that RDP and local login to that system is protected by multifactor authentication.

737 Installing Cisco Duo


- 738 1. Begin by logging into the system you wish to protect with Duo.
- 739 2. Then connect to the internet, if not connected already, and go to the Duo Admin login page at
- 740 <https://admin.duosecurity.com/>.




- 741 3. Login with your admin credentials and dual factor authentication until the admin dashboard is
742 reached.




- 743 4. Click **Applications** in the sidebar.
744 5. Click **Protect an Application**.




- 745 6. Search for, or scroll down to, **Microsoft RDP**.
- 746 7. Click **Protect**.




- 747 8. The next screen will provide policy configuration options, as well as the **Integration Key**, **Secret Key**, and **API hostname**, which are required information for the next step. Either keep this
- 748 window open or copy down those three pieces of information.
- 749




- 750 9. Download the **Duo Authentication for Windows Logon** installer package, located at
- 751 <https://dl.duosecurity.com/duo-win-login-latest.exe>.
- 752 10. Run the downloaded EXE file.




- 753 11. Click **Next**.
- 12. Copy the **API Hostname** into the labeled field.



- 754 13. Click **Next**.
- 755 14. Copy in the **Integration** and **Secret Keys** into the relevant fields and click **Next**.




- 756 15. Click **Next**.
- 757 16. Configure Duo’s integration options according to the needs of your organization. Note that
- 758 **Bypass Duo authentication when offline** will allow users to skip the two-factor authentication
- 759 when offline, which increases the availability of their files but may increase risk.




- 760 17. Click **Next**.


- 761 18. Leave **Enable Smart Card support** unchecked.




- 762 19. Click **Next**.
763 20. Leave **Enable UAC Elevation Protection** unchecked.



- 764 21. Click **Next**.



765 22. Click **Install**.




766 23. Click **Finish**.

767 24. Installation should now be complete. Users registered on the Duo Dashboard with a linked
768 phone will be allowed access to the system.

769


Registering a Duo User

- 770
1. Login to the Duo Admin Dashboard.



- 771
2. Click **Add New > User** from the drop-down menu on the right.

- 772
3. Enter a username for the user.



- 773
4. Click **Add User**.

- 774
5. This will lead you to that user's information page, where additional information (full name, email, phone number) and Duo authenticators (phone numbers, 2FA hardware tokens, WebAuthn, etc.) can be associated with that username. **Note:** A user will not be able to log into a Duo protected system unless the user is registered and has an authentication device associated with their username.

779

2.8 Dispel

780 Dispel is a network protection and user access tool that we used to provide a Virtual Desktop
 781 Infrastructure (VDI) capability. A typical deployment of Dispel is done in a largely managed fashion, with
 782 a specific deployment being tailored to a network setup. The deployment in the NCCoE laboratory may
 783 not be the best setup for any given network. The NCCoE deployment was done on an Ubuntu host with
 784 WAN and LAN interfaces, placing the device in-line between the enterprise systems and the external
 785 network.

786 **Installation**

- 787 1. Deploy an Ubuntu machine with the provided specifications, ensuring that a provided ISO is
 788 attached to the device.
 789 2. Login with username "dispel" and the password provided.

```
dispelwicket login: dispel
Password:
Linux dispelwicket 4.19.195-amd64-vyos #1 SMP Thu Feb 17 12:52:59 UTC 2022 x86_64
Welcome to VyOS!

Check out project news at https://blog.vyos.io
and feel free to report bugs at https://phabricator.vyos.net

You can change this banner using "set system login banner post-login" command.

VyOS is a free software distribution that includes multiple components,
you can check individual component licenses under /usr/share/doc/*/copyright

dispel@dispelwicket:~$
```

- 790 3. Being the installation process

791 > install image

```
dispel@dispelwicket:~$ install image
Welcome to the Dispel Wicket ESI install program. This script
will walk you through the process of installing the
Dispel Wicket ESI image to a local hard drive.
Would you like to continue? (Yes/No) [Yes]:
```

- 792 4. Press enter on the following three prompts, modifying any default options as desired.

```
Would you like to continue? (Yes/No) [Yes]:
Probing drives: OK
Looking for pre-existing RAID groups...none found.
The image will require a minimum 2000MB root.
Would you like me to try to partition a drive automatically
or would you rather partition it manually with parted? If
you have already setup your partitions, you may skip this step

Partition (Auto/Parted/Skip) [Auto]:

I found the following drives on your system:
sda    150323MB

Install the image on? [sda]:

This will destroy all data on /dev/sda.
Continue? (Yes/No) [No]:
```

- 793 5. Type yes before pressing enter to rewrite the current volume.

```
This will destroy all data on /dev/sda.
Continue? (Yes/No) [No]: yes
```

- 794 6. Press enter on the remaining prompts, modifying any default options as desired.

```
How big of a root partition should I create? (2000MB - 150323MB) [150323]MB: _
```

```

How big of a root partition should I create? (2000MB - 150323MB) [150323]MB:

Creating filesystem on /dev/sda1: OK
Done!
Mounting /dev/sda1...
What would you like to name this image? [999.202203220259]:
OK. This image will be named: 999.202203220259
Copying squashfs image...
Copying kernel and initrd images...
Done!
I found the following configuration files:
  /opt/vyatta/etc/config/config.boot
  /opt/vyatta/etc/config/config.boot.default
Which one should I copy to sda? [/opt/vyatta/etc/config/config.boot]:

Copying /opt/vyatta/etc/config/config.boot to sda.
Enter password for administrator account
Enter password for user 'dispel':

```

- 795 7. Enter and re-enter a new password for the user dispel

```

Enter password for administrator account
Enter password for user 'dispel':
Retype password for user 'dispel':
I need to install the GRUB boot loader.
I found the following drives on your system:
  sda      150323MB

```

```

Which drive should GRUB modify the boot partition on? [sda]:

```

- 796 8. Press enter one final time to finish the installation

```

Which drive should GRUB modify the boot partition on? [sda]:

```

```

Setting up grub: OK
Done!
dispel@dispelwicket:~$ _

```

- 797 9. Power off the machine, remove the provided ISO, and power it back on.

- 798 10. Log in with the user "dispel" and the new password set in step 9.

```

UNAUTHORIZED USE OF THIS SYSTEM
IS PROHIBITED!

```

```

Hint: Num Lock on

```

```

dispelwicket login: dispel
Password:
Linux dispelwicket 4.19.195-amd64-vyos #1 SMP Thu Feb 17 12:52:59 UTC 2022 x86_64
Welcome to VyOS!

```

```

Check out project news at https://blog.vyos.io
and feel free to report bugs at https://phabricator.vyos.net

```

```

You can change this banner using "set system login banner post-login" command.

```

```

VyOS is a free software distribution that includes multiple components,
you can check individual component licenses under /usr/share/doc/*/copyright

```

```

dispel@dispelwicket:~$ _

```

- 799 11. Type in the command `> ifconfig | grep inet`. Verify the output to make sure it matches
800 the desired network configuration. If not, see the next section.

```

dispel@dispelwicket:~$ ifconfig | grep inet
  inet addr:10.33.53.194 Bcast:10.33.53.207 Mask:255.255.255.240
  inet6 addr: fe80::250:56ff:fead:223e/64 Scope:Link
  inet addr:127.0.0.1 Mask:255.0.0.0
  inet6 addr: ::1/128 Scope:Host
dispel@dispelwicket:~$

```

801 **Configuring IP Addresses**

- 802 1. Log in to the device with the user “dispel”.

```

                UNAUTHORIZED USE OF THIS SYSTEM
                IS PROHIBITED!

Hint: Num Lock on

dispelwicket login: dispel
Password:
Linux dispelwicket 4.19.195-amd64-vyos #1 SMP Thu Feb 17 12:52:59 UTC 2022 x86_64
Welcome to VyOS!

Check out project news at https://blog.vyos.io
and feel free to report bugs at https://phabricator.vyos.net

You can change this banner using "set system login banner post-login" command.

VyOS is a free software distribution that includes multiple components,
you can check individual component licenses under /usr/share/doc/*/copyright

dispel@dispelwicket:~$

```

- 803 2. Type in the command `> configure`.

```

dispel@dispelwicket:~$ configure
[edit]
dispel@dispelwicket# _

```

- 804 3. Type in the command `> del interfaces ethernet eth0`, or whichever interface you
805 are currently modifying.

```

dispel@dispelwicket# del interfaces ethernet eth0
[edit]
dispel@dispelwicket# _

```

- 806 4. Type in the command `> set interfaces ethernet eth0 address` followed by the
807 desired IP address in CIDR notation, modifying for the desired interface as appropriate.

```

dispel@dispelwicket# set interfaces ethernet eth0 address 192.168.2.213/28
[edit]
dispel@dispelwicket# _

```

- 808 5. Type in the command `> commit`.

```

dispel@dispelwicket# commit
[edit]
dispel@dispelwicket#

```

- 809 6. Type in the command `> save`.

```

dispel@dispelwicket# save
Saving configuration to '/config/config.boot'...
Done
[edit]
dispel@dispelwicket# _

```

- 810 7. Type in the command `> exit`.

```

dispel@dispelwicket# exit
exit
dispel@dispelwicket:~$

```

811

812 [Configuring Network](#)

813 The following instructions are to modify a Dispel wicket device to forward traffic to a different routing
814 device. This may be desirable for some network setups.

- 815 1. Type in the command `> configure` to the Dispel wicket device after logging in.

```

dispel@dispelwicket:~$ ifconfig | grep inet
inet addr:10.33.53.194 Bcast:10.33.53.207 Mask:255.255.255.240
inet6 addr: fe80::250:56ff:fead:223e/64 Scope:Link
inet addr:127.0.0.1 Mask:255.0.0.0
inet6 addr: ::1/128 Scope:Host
dispel@dispelwicket:~$ configure
[edit]
dispel@dispelwicket# _

```

- 816 2. Type in the command `> set protocols static route 0.0.0/0 next-hop`
817 followed by the IP address of the router you wish to forward to.

```

dispel@dispelwicket# set protocols static route 0.0.0.0/0 next-hop 192.168.1.1
[edit]
dispel@dispelwicket#

```

- 818 3. Type in the command `> commit`.

```

dispel@dispelwicket# commit
[edit]
dispel@dispelwicket#

```

- 819 4. Type in the command `> save`.

```

dispel@dispelwicket# save
Saving configuration to '/config/config.boot'...
Done
[edit]
dispel@dispelwicket# _

```

- 820 5. Type in the command `> exit`.

```

dispel@dispelwicket# exit
exit
dispel@dispelwicket:~$

```


- 821 6. On the designated router or firewall, ensure UDP is allowed from the Dispel device on the
822 provided port. For the NCCoE deployment, port 1194 was utilized. A target destination for the
823 traffic will be provided by Dispel.

- 824 7. Modify the IP addresses of the south-side network interface to properly align with your
825 network. See the “Configuring IP Addresses” section above.


826 [Adding a Device](#)

- 827 1. On the workstation in question, ensure that ping and RDP are accessible, including allowing such
828 connections through a local firewall.


- 829 2. Authenticate to the Dispel webpage with the provided credentials.




830 3. Click on the **Devices** page on the sidebar and click **Create**.




831 4. Under the **Add Device** window, fill out all fields, including **Facility, Wicket, Name, Make, Model,**
 832 **IP, and Protocol.**



833 5. Click **Add Device**.



834 6. Under **Access** for that device, search for the user(s) that will have access to that device. Verify
835 they have the correct access settings.




- 836 7. If a user is not already a member of the region, click **Members** in the sidebar and click **Invite**. Fill
 837 out relevant information for this individual and click **Invite this Member**.

838 2.9 Integration: FireEye Helix and Symantec SWG


839 In this integration the output of the web isolation tool, Symantec SWG, will be forwarded to our SIEM,
 840 FireEye Helix. In this guide, we will aim to forward most logs to our SIEM, which can collect, analyze, and
 841 report on these logs to better maintain awareness of our systems and provide a single interface for
 842 analyzing the health of the system. Logs from WSS will allow us to see statistics on the number of
 843 threats which have been blocked, as well as any administrative changes made to the WSS product.

844 Configure Fireeye Helix to Collect Logs from Symantec SWG


- 845 1. Navigate to the Symantec dashboard, and login.
 846 2. Navigate to **Account Configuration** by clicking the gear icon on the left sidebar.




- 847 3. Click **API Credentials**.
- 848 4. Click **Add**.
- 849 5. Check the boxes next to **Reporting Access Logs, Location Management, Audit Logs, Agent Con-**
- 850 **fig Management, and Egress IP**.
- 851 6. Set an **Expiration Date** for the credential (1 year recommended).
- 852 7. Copy the **Username** and **Password** provided, as you will not be able to retrieve these once you
- 853 create the credential.



- 854 8. Click **Save**.




855 9. On the Helix Dashboard, click **Configure > Cloud Connect**.




856 10. Click **Add Cloud Connection**.


857 11. Click the arrow next to Symantec Web Security Service.



858 12. Click **Install**.



859 13. Enter the username and password from the credential created earlier.




- 860 14. Click **Submit and Verify**.
- 861 15. Click **Back to Home**. You will now be able to see events from Symantec WSS in Helix.

862 2.10 Integration: FireEye Helix and PKWARE PKProtect

863 In the following section, PKWARE PKProtect, which has been configured to identify and encrypt sensitive
 864 data, will be configured to forward these events to FireEye Helix. Logs from PKWARE PKProtect will
 865 allow us to monitor the use of encryption throughout the enterprise, and catch any suspicious
 866 decryptions which may indicate a breach. This section assumes the Helix Communications Broker has
 867 already been installed.

868 Configure the Helix Communications Broker


- 869 1. On the CentOS system with the Helix Communications Broker installed, run the following
 870 commands:
 871 `> cd /opt/tap-nxlog`
 872 `> sudo ./setup.sh`
- 873 2. Select **Add Routes** and press **Enter**.
- 874 3. Select **bsd**.
- 875 4. Select **tcp**.
- 876 5. Select the IP address of the network interface which should receive logs.
- 877 6. Enter 513 for the port.



- 878 7. Select **OK** and press **Enter**.
 879 8. Select **OK** and press **Enter**.


880 Configure PKWARE PKProtect to Forward Events

- 881 1. Navigate to the PKWARE PKProtect web portal.
 882 2. Click the **Basics** link at the top of the page.
 883 3. Scroll down to the **Data Security Intelligence** section.
 884 4. Next to **Dashboard Elasticsearch Target**, click **Internal**.
 885 5. Uncheck the box next to **Use Internal Elasticsearch**.
 886 6. Uncheck the box next to **Enable DSI in Dashboard**.



- 887 7. Click **Save**.
 888 8. In the **Data Security Intelligence** section, click **Internal** next to **Target**.

- 889 9. Select **Syslog TCP RFC-3164** for **Target**.
- 890 10. Enter the URL and port of the Helix Communications Broker that was just configured.




- 891 11. Click **Save**.
- 892 12. Verify that PKWARE logs now show up in Helix.

893 2.11 Integration: FireEye Helix and Cisco Duo


894 In this integration, FireEye Helix will be configured to collect logs from Cisco Duo. Cisco Duo is our multi-
895 factor authentication mechanism and acts as source of information both for detecting breaches and for
896 detecting insider threats. Information about a login, such as the username, time, location, are all useful
897 in the event of a breach. Furthermore, they are useful as a baseline for user activity, which can be used
898 as a comparison point for detecting unusual behavior.

899 Configure Fireeye Helix to Collect Logs from Cisco Duo


- 900 1. On the Cisco Duo dashboard navigate to **Applications**.




901 2. Click **Protect an Application**.




902 3. Click **Admin API**.




- 903 4. Scroll down and check the boxes next to **Grant administrators, Grant read information, Grant**
- 904 **applications, Grant settings, Grant read log, Grant read resource, and Grant write resource**
- 905 5. Click **Save**.
- 906 6. Login to the Helix dashboard.
- 907 7. Navigate to **Configure > Cloud Connect**.
- 908 8. Click **See Available Connections**.
- 909 9. Type “Duo” in the Search box.




- 910 10. Click the **Arrow** next to the Cisco Duo integration and click **Install**.



911 11. Copy the **Integration Key**, **Secret Key**, and **API hostname** (not including duosecurity.com) to the
912 appropriate fields on the Helix Cloud Connect page.



913 12. Click **Submit and Verify**.



914 13. If successful, you should see a screen about the integration being successful.

915 2.12 Integration: FireEye Helix and QCOR ForceField

916 In this integration, we will configure the collection of logs from ForceField, our database encryption
 917 solution, into FireEye Helix. Detailed logs describing encryption and decryption are useful for
 918 determining how much of an enterprise is encrypted, and statistics and records in this area can prepare
 919 the organization for the event of a breach. For the purposes of this guide, we will assume ForceField is
 920 running on a Windows Server, and we would like to transfer files from this server to a Linux server. If
 921 you are using a Linux server for ForceField, you can skip to the configuration of rsyslog to forward logs
 922 directly to the Helix Comm Broker.

923 Configure an SFTP server on Windows

924 In this section, we will configure an SFTP server on the Windows system to allow for encrypted,
 925 automated download of Forcefield's logs onto a Linux server. We have specifically elected not to use
 926 Windows SMB for this scenario because we would like to demonstrate an encrypted transfer of logs
 927 from Windows to Linux. We chose SFTP over FTPS because automation of FTPS would at some point
 928 require a plaintext password, while SFTP can default to the system's SSH capabilities.

929 Once on Linux, rsyslog can be configured to use TLS for encrypted transfer according to the needs of the
 930 organization.

- 931 1. Download OpenSSH from here (<https://github.com/PowerShell/Win32-OpenSSH/releases>). Dur-
 932 ing the creation of this guide, version V8.9.1.0p1-Beta was used.
- 933 2. Extract to C:\Program Files\OpenSSH.
- 934 3. In a Powershell window, navigate to the folder you extracted it to, and run the following com-
 935 mand to install the server.
 936 `powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File ./install-`
 937 `sshd.ps1`
- 938 4. Run the following command to open the firewall port for OpenSSH.

- 939 Run `New-NetFirewallRule -Name sshd -DisplayName 'OpenSSH`
 940 `SSH Server' -Enabled True -Direction Inbound -Protocol TCP -`
 941 `Action Allow -LocalPort 22 -Program`
 942 `"C:\Windows\System32\OpenSSH\sshd.exe"`
- 943 5. Open **services.msc** and start the **OpenSSH SSH server**.
 - 944 6. Create a file called **authorized_keys** in `C:\Users\<<Your Username>\.ssh`. If needed, create the
 945 **.ssh** folder (Windows will not allow you to create it by default – naming the folder **.ssh**. will al-
 946 low you to bypass this restriction.)
 - 947 7. Generate a key using `./ssh-keygen`. Copy the contents of the generated public key (.pub file)
 948 into the **authorized_keys** file created earlier. The private key should be placed in the `~/.`**ssh**
 949 folder on the Linux machine.
 - 950 8. Right click the **authorized_keys** file and click **Properties**.
 - 951 9. Click **Disable Inheritance**.
 - 952 10. Select **Convert inherited permissions into explicit permissions on this object**.
 - 953 11. Using the remove button, remove all accounts other than SYSTEM from the list. Ensure that the
 954 SYSTEM account has full control.
 - 955 12. Under `C:\ProgramData\ssh`, open `sshd_config`.
 - 956 13. Comment out these lines by adding '#' characters before each line, like so:
 957 `#Match Group administrators`
 958 `# AuthorizedKeysFile`
 959 `__PROGRAMDATA__/ssh/administrators_authorized_keys`
 - 960 14. Add the following lines to the `sshd_config` file to ensure that RSA public key authentication is
 961 allowed.
 962 `PubkeyAuthentication yes`
 963 `PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes+=ssh-rsa`
 - 964 15. Add the directory `C:\Program Files\OpenSSH` to the system path – this is necessary so that the
 965 server can find the `sftp-server.exe` file.
 - 966 16. Add the following lines to `sshd_config` file to configure the SFTP server.
 967 `ForceCommand internal-sftp`
 968 `ChrootDirectory C:\GreenTec\ForceField\log`
 - 969 17. Alternatively, if it's preferable to set the root directory somewhere else and move the log file,
 970 you can also do that. To edit the log file location, simply open `C:\GreenTec\Forcefield\wfs.conf`
 971 and change **Logpath** to a different directory, and update **ChrootDirectory** to point to that.
 - 972 18. After doing this, you should be able to authenticate over SSH to the server. If the authentication
 973 fails, you can check the logs in Event Viewer on the server, under **Applications and Services Logs**
 974 **> OpenSSH > Operational** to see the reason for the failure.

975 Configure the Linux Machine to Download and Send Logs to the Helix 976 Communications Broker

- 977 19. On the Linux server, we can use `sftp` to download the file. Ensure that you replace the username
 978 and hostname with the username and hostname of your actual SSH server.
 979 `sftp administrator@forcefield.dc.ipdrr:/ForceField.log`
 980 `/tmp/ForceField.log`
- 981 20. For automation purposes, we can use cron jobs to automatically download this file at regular
 982 intervals. Use `crontab` to edit the list of cron jobs.

983 Crontab -e
 984 21. Enter the interval and command for sftp in the crontab file. The following line will download the
 985 log file once an hour. Ensure that you replace the username and hostname with the username
 986 and hostname of your actual SSH server.

```
987           0 * * * * sftp
988           administrator@forcefield.dc.ipdrr:/ForceField.log
989           /tmp/ForceField.log
```

990 22. Next, we will use **rsyslog** to forward this log file to the Helix Comm Broker.

991 23. Open **/etc/rsyslog.conf**, and add the following line, using the IP and port of the Helix Comm Bro-
 992 ker. (Note that putting a single '@' symbol here indicates UDP. Use two, such as '@@' for TCP.)

```
993           *. * @192.168.1.206:514
```

994 24. Create a file **/etc/rsyslog.d/forcefield.conf** and enter the following lines in it.

```
995           sudo nano /etc/rsyslog.d/forcefield.conf
996           $ModLoad imfile
997           $InputFilePollInterval 10
998           $PrivDropToGroup adm
999           $InputFileName /tmp/ForceField.log
1000           $InputFileTag FORCEFIELD
1001           $InputFileStateFile Stat-FORCEFIELD
1002           $InputFileFacility local8
1003           $InputRunFileMonitor
1004           $InputFilePersistStateInterval 1000
```

```
$ModLoad imfile
$InputFilePollInterval 10
$PrivDropToGroup adm
$InputFileName /tmp/ForceField.log
$InputFileTag FORCEFIELD
$InputFileStateFile Stat-FORCEFIELD
$InputFileSeverity forcefield
$InputFileFacility local8
$InputRunFileMonitor
$InputFilePersistStateInterval 1000
```

1005 25. Restart rsyslog.

```
1006           sudo service rsyslog restart
```

1007 2.13 Integration: FireEye Helix and Dispel


1008 In this integration, we configure the collection of logs from Dispel, our network protection solution.
 1009 Because Dispel controls access from users to enterprise systems it is important to have an overview of
 1010 its actions through log collection and reporting. Dispel personnel can perform this integration by simply
 1011 providing them with the protocol, port, and IP address of the Helix Communications Broker and allowing
 1012 them to configure it on the on-premise Dispel wicket.

1013 2.14 Integration: Avrio SIFT and PKWARE PKProtect


1014 When used together, SIFT and PKProtect can protect sensitive data accidentally dropped into public
 1015 shares on the enterprise. In [Section 2.6](#), we detail how to configure SIFT to detect sensitive data in a
 1016 Windows Share and move it to a location designated for sensitive information. Now, we will
 1017 demonstrate how to ensure that location is protected by PKProtect, which will automatically encrypt the
 1018 data.

1019 Configuring PKWARE PKProtect


- 1020 1. Navigate to the PKProtect dashboard and login.
- 1021 2. Navigate to **Archive > Discovery**.




- 1022 3. Click **Pattern – Dictionary**.
- 1023 4. Enter a name for these patterns in the **Name** field.
- 1024 5. Enter keywords to match in the **Keywords** field.




- 1025 6. Click **Save**.
- 1026 7. Click **Add Discovery**.
- 1027 8. Under **Pattern**, select the name of the **Pattern** you just created.
- 1028 9. For **Threshold**, enter the number of matches of this pattern needed to consider the file
- 1029 sensitive.




- 1030 10. Click **Save**.
- 1031 11. Navigate to **Archive > Lockers**.
- 1032 12. Ensure that a PKWARE client is installed on the device which will be monitored for encryption.
- 1033 The device should show up in the list. If it doesn't you can search for the device and select it
- 1034 from the list.



- 1035 13. Click **Add** on the device you wish to add a locker for.
- 1036 14. Enter a **Name** for the locker.
- 1037 15. Enter the **path** to the protected folder.
- 1038 16. Select **AES 256** for the **Algorithm**.
- 1039 17. Select the PKWARE Smartkey to use.
- 1040 18. Check all the boxes next to **Encryption Events**.



- 1041 19. Check the box next to **Enable Discovery Mode**.
- 1042 20. Add the relevant rules to the **Smart Filter Bundles** box.
- 1043 21. Select **Report and Encrypt** for **Remediation Action**.



- 1044 22. Click **Save**.
- 1045 23. Now the folder on the device you selected will be monitored, and files which match the selected
- 1046 rules will be encrypted automatically.

1047 2.15 Integration: Dispel and Cisco Duo

1048 In this build, Dispel acts as an intermediary between the user and enterprise systems, by providing

1049 temporary remote desktops with access to enterprise systems. In this integration, we primarily installed

1050 Cisco Duo on the enterprise systems, to require multifactor authentication over RDP between Dispel's

1051 temporary remote desktops and the enterprise systems.

1052 In this particular integration, no extra work was required other than installing Cisco Duo (see [Section](#)

1053 [2.7](#)) on systems to control remote desktop access between Dispel machines and the other machines.

1054 However, it is important for organizations to check that this integration works and is present, to ensure

1055 that multifactor authentication is being applied to users who are logging in remotely.

1056 **Appendix A List of Acronyms**

1057 Provide a list of alphabetized acronyms and abbreviations and spell out each one. Use Word Style:

1058 Glossary. Bold each acronym to enhance readability.

SIEM	Security Information and Event Management
RDP	Remote Desktop Protocol
IP	Internet Protocol
TCP	Transmission Control Protocol
SFTP	Secure File Transfer Protocol
DNS	Domain Name Service
NTP	Network Time Protocol
2FA	Two Factor Authentication
UDP	User Datagram Protocol
WSS	Web Security Service
TLS	Transport Layer Security
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
GPO	Group Policy Object
PAC	Proxy Auto Configuration
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
REST	Representational State Transfer
API	Application Programming Interface
WFS	Write-protected File System