SEPTEMBER 2022 WHITEPAPER

# **DNS LAYER SECURITY**

# FROM THE MITRE ATT&CK PERSPECTIVE



www.dnssense.com

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

•	WHAT IS MITRE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK?	3
•	WHY DO WE NEED MITRE ATT&CK?	4
•	WHAT IS ATT&CK?	5
	IOC (INDICATOR OF COMPROMISE) IOA (INDICATOR OF ATTACK)	6
	ATT&CK MODEL	6
	ATT&CK MODEL - TTP RELATIONSHIP	8
	CYBER KILL CHAIN	8
•	FOR WHAT PURPOSES CAN THE MITRE BE USED?	12
	DNS SPOOFING / CACHE POISINING	12
	DNS LAYER SECURITY THREATS (DNS TUNNELLING)	14
	DGA DOMAINS	16
	PUNYCODE / HOMOGLYPHIC ATTACKS	18
	TWO IMPORTANT COMPONENTS OF THE DNS SECURITY CONCEPT	21
•	CONCLUSION	22
	REFERENCES	23



\_

# What is MITRE ATT&CK Framework?

MITRE ATT&CK is one of the most popular methodologies among information security professionals. In the field of information security, MITRE Corporation is known for its CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) list **cve.mitre.org**. This is a database of known vulnerabilities that was launched in 1999 and has since become one of the most important sources for structuring and storing data on software bugs.






# Why Do We Need MITRE ATT&CK?

Using data from the MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base, anyone involved in cyber defence can investigate and compare offensive activity and then understand the best options for defence. The framework is a free, accessible, and open knowledge base.

The core of the ATT&CK framework is that it is the most up-to-date information centre showing the behavioural anatomy of an attack and attackers. It was created exclusively by observing cyberattacks in the real world.





# What is ATT&CK?

While collecting and understanding hash values is a broad spectrum, the ATTACK framework helps us interpret this **TTP** (TTP is short for Tactical, technical and procedural).





Figure 1 : David Bianco pyramid of pain



# IOC (Indicator of Compromise) IOA (Indicator of Attack)

Collecting IOC (Indicator of Compromise) no longer works well in institutions. While IOCs give us piecemeal pieces of a cyberattack that are always static, IOA provides significant Collecting IOCs (Indicator of Compromise) no longer works well in institutions. While IOCs only give us piecemeal pieces of a cyberattack that are always static, IOA offers significant advantages in understanding the attacker's techniques and behavioural analysis to understand the entire attack.



### ATT&CK Model

MITRE introduced the ATT&CK matrix in 2013 to describe and categorize aggressor behaviour (behaviour modelling) based on real-world observations. Before we get into the use of the matrix, let us take a look at the basic concepts:

ТАСТІС	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilage Escalation	De	efense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control
TECHNIQUE	Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bachrc	Access Token Manipilation			Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Automated Exfiltration	Commonly Used Port
	Exploit Puplic- Facing Application	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	віт	Inhs Rash History Window      Drive-by Compromise      Adve-by compromise is when an adversary gains access to a system through     a user using a watche over the normal course of browning. With this     workings, the watche over the normal course of browning with the     dentrains, the watche over the normal course of browning. With this     workings, the watche over the normal course of browning. This can help on     In several ways, but them are at the main components:     Aluficity ways of delivering exploit code to a browner each, including:     A legitimate ways of adverting exploit code to a browner, cross-alle scripting.     Maticity are good for addressed through legitimate and providers.			Application Deployment Automated		Data Compressed	Communicate Through Removable Media
	Hardware Additions	Command Line Interface	AppCert DLLs	AppCert DLLs	Bi				Drive-by Com Techniq ID T1169 Tactic Initial Access Platform Linux, Windo	-	Data Encrypted	Connection Proxy
	Replication Through Removable Media	Control Panel Items	AppInit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Bi				Permissions User Required Data Packet captur Sources Network devic Process use o Web provy,	e, ze logs, d natwork, sion detection system,	Data Transfer Size Limits	Custom
						Often the website used t such as government, a p	by an adversary is one visited particular industry, or region, o d of tangeted attack is referre	where the goal is to compror	nise a specific user or set of	fusers based on a	PROCE	DURE

Figure 2 : ATT&CK Model



#### • TACTICS

The way the attacker behaves in the different phases of his operation represents the attacker's goal or the objective he is trying to achieve in a particular step. These are initial access, execution, persistence, privilege escalation, defence evasion, credential access, discovery, lateral movement, collection, command and control, exfiltration, and impact.

**Example :** TA0002 (The attacker wants to execute malicious code).

#### TECHNICAL

How the attacker achieved the goal or task, what tools, technologies, codes, exploits, utilities, etc. This is the part where the details are used. Examples of procedures, depending on tactics, are included here.

Example : T1059.001 (PowerShell - using PowerShell in an attack)

#### PROCEDURES

A set of information showing how and why the technique is used. Procedures include information about attacker groups, descriptions of associated groups, techniques used, version, creation and modification dates, and software.

**Example :** APT19 (Detailed information on how the technique is executed)

#### MITIGATIONS

What techniques are addressed by each mitigation method and used to interpret the TTP?

Example: M1056 (Mitigation ID and techniques are in this field)

#### GROUPS

The method can be read with the group; it is the part where the relationships between the groups and the techniques they use most often are communicated.

**Example :** G0045 (Identity, other related groups and the techniques they use are here).

#### SOFTWARE

It is the addressing of malware and tools used by attacker groups.

**Example : S0671** (Tomiris tool - Contains information such as type, techniques used, creation and modification dates).



### **ATT&CK Model - TTP Relationship**

The attackers choose their motivation according to tactics as they construct the attack. Again, the relationship diagram above shows which tool and technique or sub-technique must be used to apply the tactic.

MITRE ATT&CK provides an objective environment to assess cybersecurity risks and identify potential vulnerabilities. Once these gaps are known, your organization can make objective decisions about how to address these risks. Your organization can then prioritize and make the best business decisions for deploying security controls and other resources.




Figure 3 : ATT&CK model – TTP relationship

### **Cyber Kill Chain**

Cyber Kill Chain is the attack methodology that determines the sequence of actions that lead the attacker to the target, and Mitre is the ATT&CK methodology library.



Figure 4 : Cyber Kill Chain



In a well-known methodology for cyber attacks, called the cyber kill chain, the steps of a cyber attack are outlined. We know that at least one of these steps must involve a malicious DNS request to trigger an attack.

80% of domains with malware have no immediate IP address, malware requests without an IP address can only be detected in the DNS log. **With DNSSense products, we provide protection and analysis at the DNS level.** It is used by all protocols such as DNS, HTTP, HTTPS, Smtp and IoT. DNS traffic provides information about your entire network, not just the application layer.

			Source		Destinat	ion			Decision	
#	Time \↓	Src.lp	, Host Name 🗐	↓ User च	Subdomain	≣t	Dst. lp	≣t	Category	≣t
				Admin			0.0.45.23			
					facebook.com				Social Network	
				Admin			0.0.42.67			
					slack.com					
06	2022-02-12 13:07:18	10.0.0.27	oracle-db	Admin	beatingcorona.com		0.0.0.0		Malware/Virus	
06	<u>2022-02-12 13:07:18</u>	10.0.027	oracle-db	Admin	facebook.com		0.0.34.23		Social Network	
				Admin			0.0.34.23		Technology and Computer	
				Admin			0.0.34.23			
					facebook.com				Social Networks	
				Admin Admin	facebook.com google.com		0.0.34.23			

Figure 5: A malicious domain without an IP address

The MITRE ATT&CK matrix began with an internal project called the FMX (Fort Meade Experiment). This tasked security experts to simulate hostile TTP against the network, and then collected and analyzed data on attacks against it. This data later formed the basis for ATT&CK. Because the ATT&CK matrix is a fairly complete description of attacker behaviour when hacking networks, the matrix is useful for various attack and defence dimensions, appearance models, and other mechanisms (e.g., FSTEC threat modelling).

MITRE has divided ATT&CK into several summary matrices: - Enterprise - TTP used in attacks against organizations; - TTP related to mobile and wearable devices; - ICS - industrial control systems, and TTP for industrial systems.



Each of the above tactics and techniques is related to the subject of this matrix. The most popular matrix is Enterprise. In turn, it consists of different parts, each of which has its responsibility:




Figure 6: ATT&CK matrices



There are 3 basic types of attacks. Access to information is granted in groups.



#### **PRE-ATT&CK**

Priority Defination (Planning, Direction) Target Selection Information Gathering (Technical, people, organizational) Weakness Identification (Technical, people, organizational) Adversary OpSec Establish & Maintain Infrastructure Persona Development Build Capabilities Test Capabilities Stage Capabilities

#### **ENTERPRISE ATT&CK**

Initial Access Execution Persistence Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Credential Access Discovery Lateral Movement Collection Extrafiltration Command and Control

Figure 7: Cyber Kill Chain mapped to MITRE PRE-ATT&CK and ATT&CK


The Pre-ATT&CK matrix includes gathering information, planning, identifying vulnerabilities and testing the planned plan. It is the process of responding to the actions in the ATT&CK framework in the organisation's ATT&CK matrix after the compromise.



Figure 8: ATT&CK Enterprise matrix for the Kill Chain model



# For What Purposes Can the MITRE Be Used?



Let's examine DNS infrastructure attacks with examples, using MITRE ATT&CK techniques and procedures.

# **Example-1** DNS Spoofing / Cache Poisoning

The example gives a description and motivation for the tactic. It has been said that attackers can use this tactic to compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during the attack, and during post-invasion activities, attackers can use DNS traffic for various tasks, including command and control (e.g., Application Layer Protocol).



MITRE   ATT&CK"					Matrices Tactics • Techniques • Da	nta Sources Mitigations - Gr	oups Software Resource	es = Blog 🗗 Contribute	e Search					
TECHNIQUES		Home > Te	ichniques > Enterp	orise > Compromis	e Infrastructure > DNS Server									
nterprise Reconnaissance Resource Development	~	_			structure: DNS Server	~			_					
Acquire Infrastructure Compromise Accounts Compromise Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server	~ ~	Other sub-techniques of Compremise Intrastructure (6)       ID: T1594.002         Adversaries may compromise third party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS       Sub-technique of: T1594         traffic for various task, including for Command and Control (ex: Application Layer Protocol). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may utilize DNS       ID: T1594.002         group compromise third party DNS servers in support of operations.       ID: T1594.002       ID: T1594.002         By compromising DNS servers, adversaries can after DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection       ID: Tastic: Becords Development       ID: Platforms: PRE         By compromising DNS servers, adversaries can after DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection       Version: 1.2       Contributors: Jerremy Galloway         utaffic to adversary-controlle infrastructure, minicking normal trusted network communications. <sup>DDR</sup> Adversaries may also be able to silently create       Last Modified: 19 April 2022												
Server Botnet Web Services Develop Capabilities	~		ations	cious servers with	Version Permalink									
Establish Accounts	~	ID	Mitigation	Descripti	on									
Obtain Capabilities	~	M1056	Pre-comprom	ise This tec	chnique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls.									
tage Capabilities tial Access ecution	~ ~ ~	Detec	tion											
rsistence	~	ID	Data Source	Data Component	Onent Detects									
vilege Escalation fense Evasion	ž	DS0038	Domain Name	Active DNS	Monitor for queried domain name system (DHS) registry data that may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Comrol.									
edential Access scovery teral Movement	~ ~ ~			Passive DNS	Monitor for logged domain name system (DNS) registry data that may compromise third party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary affecycle, such as durin Command and Control.									
election	č	Refer	ences											
mmand and Control filtration	~	1. Merc Octo	er, W., Rascagnen ber 9, 2020.		mber 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved	2017.	. Threat Spotlight: Angler Lurking							
npact	ž		i, M., Jones, S., Ri ale. Retrieved Oct		uary 10). Global DNS Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation	<ol> <li>Proofpoint Staff. (2015, Dece to pull in Angler EK. Retrieved</li> </ol>	mber 15). The shadow knows: N i October 16, 2020.	falvertising campaigns use don	nain shadow					

Figure 9: DNS Server ATT&CK technique in MITRE

In the second part, detailed information such as ID, on which platform it can be used, version, creation date and modification date are provided for quick access.

#### • DNS SPOOFING

- 1) attackers try to inject a spoofed address into the DNS
- 2) if the server accepts a spoofed address, the cache is sent
- 3) the requests are then processed by the attacker's server

**DNS spoofing** is a type of cyberattack in which an attacker redirects the victim's traffic (instead of a legitimate IP address) to a malicious website. Attackers use DNS cache poisoning to intercept Internet traffic and steal credentials or confidential information. DNS cache poisoning and spoofing are identical terms that are often used interchangeably.



# **Example-2** DNS Layer Security Threats (DNS tunnelling)

MITRE   ATT&CK				Matrices	Tactics -	Techniques -	Data Sources	Mitigations +	Groups	Software	Resources -	Blog (3*	Contribute	Search Q																	
TECHNIQUES		Home x Te	choicues à Enterorise à	Application Laws Protocol > DNS																											
Enterprise	^	Analiantian Lawa Data at DNO																													
Reconnaissance	~	Appl	ication La	ayer Protocol: DNS																											
Resource Development	~	Strike a		Application Layer Frotocol (4)					~	ID: T107																					
Initial Access	~											1																			
Execution	~	Adversaries may communicate using the bornain Name system (UNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network intering by blending in with										Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the ① Tactic: Command and Control																			
Persistence	~	existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the Client and server.																													
Privilege Escalation	~	The DNS or	In and vertex. DNS protocol serves an administrative function in computer networking and thus may be very common in environments. DNS traffic may also be wed even before network authentication is completed. DNS packets contain many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Other known as																												
Defense Evasion	~																														
Credential Access	~	DNS tunnel	ing, adversaries may at	buse DNS to communicate with systems under	r their control	within a victim net	work while also m	imicking normal,			: 15 March 2020																				
Discovery	~	expected tr	ected traffic_F127 Last Modified: 21 October 2020 Version Perma																												
Lateral Movement	~																														
Collection	~	Drooo	dure Examp																												
Command and Control	^	PIOCE	uure Examp	JIES																											
Application Layer Protocol	^	ID	Name	Description																											
Web Protocols		S0504	Anchor	Variants of Anchor can use DNS tunnelin	g to communi	cate with C2.[3][4]																									
File Transfer Protocols		G0026	APT18	APT18 uses DNS for C2 communication	. 19																										
Mail Protocols		00020																													
DNS		G0087 APT39 APT39 has used remote access tools that leverage DN				ge DNS in communications with C2. <sup>[6]</sup>																									
Communication Through Removable Media		G0096	APT41	APT41 used DNS for C2 communication	s.[7]10																										
Data Encoding	~	\$0360	BONDUPDATER	BONDUDDATED and use DNC and TXT of	corde within it	e DNC turcellog o	ratacal for commu	I Instaco bas ba																							
Data Obfuscation	×	30300	BONDOFDATEN	BONDUPDATER can use DNS and TXT records within its DNS tunneling protocol for command and control. <sup>[10]</sup> Chimera has used Cobalt Strike to encapsulate C2 in DNS traffic. <sup>[11]</sup>																											
Dynamic Resolution	×	G0114	Chimera																												
Encrypted Channel	×	G0080	Cobalt Group	Cobalt Group has used DNS tunneling fo	r C2.[11][12][13]																										
Fallback Channels		S0154	Cobalt Strike	Cobalt Strike can use a custom comman	Instead back b	nextoool that own	ha anoanculated in	DAIR All protocole	use their st	noine breheet	and monte [14[15]]	8																			
Ingress Tool Transfer		30134	COURT SUME	Cobart Strike Can use a Costorn Comman	o ano consor	protocol triat carri	ve encapsulated in	ones. An protocon	were unter as	anuaru assiy	ieu porta.																				
Multi-Stage Channels		\$0338	Cobian RAT	Cobian RAT uses DNS for C2.[17]																											
Non-Application Layer Protocol		S0354	Denis	Denis has used DNS tunneling for C2 co	mmunications	[16][19][20]																									
Non-Standard Port		\$0377	Ebury	Ebury has used DNS requests over UDP	out 53 for 02	(21)																									
Protocol Tunneling		00311	coory									-																			
Proxy	~	G0046	FIN7	FIN7 has performed C2 using DNS via A,	OPT, and TXT	records. <sup>[22]</sup>																									
Remote Access Software		80666	Gelsenium			inst																									



The attackers' attacks, examples of procedures, and explanations are detailed at MITRE.


#### • WHAT IS DNS TUNNELING

Web browsing, email, active directory, etc. All sorts of different services, such as using the Domain Name System (DNS) protocol to convert IP addresses into human-readable names. DNS was never used for data transmission, but for years it was intended to be used for that purpose by malicious people.

Cunning hackers realised that it was possible to secretly communicate with the victim's computer by injecting control commands and malicious data into the DNS protocol. This is the basic idea behind the DNS tunnel.

Mostly used to bypass network security controls for **data exfiltration** and **C2 communication** Tunnel protocols such as HTTP, FTP, and SSH over DNS.





The DNS tunnel detection and prevention module is part of the DNSSense Secure DNS cloud platform and is one of the features it offers. With this module, any DNS tunnelling attack activity is detected, blocked and reported very quickly, before any information about the file reaches the malicious attacker or the target it is directed to. Thus, data leaks are completely prevented.

DNS tunnelling is the attackers' preferred method of data theft, as it is almost undetectable by data loss protection products, other application-level security products, or network security teams to grab the important corporate data at their targets.



These are domains that are created with a certain algorithm according to the system clock. These domains are registered only when the zombie network is commanded and has the IP address. The owner of the zombie army has two goals:

- Preventing the command centre connection domains from being discovered by security researchers.
- Unlocking the zombie army on a temporal basis.

Category	E DGA Domain	더 Monitor Tra	affic View		Save Filter Saved Reports
14		DGA Domain	0.0.0	64	0.04%
15	(e) yxxxhj.com	DGA Domain	0.0.0.0	63	0.04%
16	<u>€</u> 326861.com	DGA Domain	0.0.0	62	0.04%
17	(0) hdcecd.com	DGA Domain	0.0.0.0	62	0.04%
18	◎ hollyflicks.com	DGA Domain	0.0.0.0	62	0.04%
19	🥑 yixianwen.com	DGA Domain	0.0.0.0	63	0.04%
20	(0) hnlx68.com	DGA Domain	0.0.0	60	0.04%
21	(0) faextdom.bank	DGA Domain	0.0.0.0	59	0.04%
22	受 hbxnxsls.com	DGA Domain	0.0.0.0	57	0.03%
23	(0) hbycjt.com	DGA Domain	0.0.0.0	57	0.03%
24	⊕ hxscjt.com	DGA Domain	0.0.0	57	0.03%
25	◎ zgbmbi.com	DGA Domain	0.0.0.0	56	0.03%
26	. ejjcx.com	DGA Domain	0.0.0	55	0.03%

Figure 12: IP number of the DGA domains 0.0.0.0



DGA malware family	Primary Function	DGA Classification
Bobax	C&C	Binary
Murofet	C&C	Binary
Sinowal (Torpig)	C&C	Binary
Zeus GameOver (V1, V2, V3)	C&C	Binary
NeverQuest	C&C	Binary
Ramdo	C&C	Binary
FlashBack	C&C	Binary
PushDo	C&C	Binary
InfoStealer Shiz	C&C	Binary
Dyre/Dyreza	C&C	Binary
Cryptolocker (Ransomware)	C&C	Binary

Figure 13: DGA malware family and functions

MITRE   ATT&CK				Matrices Tactics • Techniques • Data Sources Mitigations • Groups Software Resources • Blog G* Contribute Search C
TECHNIQUES		Home > Tech	miques > Enterprise > Dyr	namic Resolution > Domain Generation Algorithms
Persistence	~	Duno	mia Dagalı	ution: Domain Congration Algorithms
Privilege Escalation	~	Dyna	mic Resolu	ution: Domain Generation Algorithms
Defense Evasion	~	Other su	ub-techniques of Dyr	namic Resolution (3) VID: T1568.002
Credential Access	~	Adversaries	may make use of Domain	n Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command and control traffic rather Sub-technique of: T1568
iscovery	× I			esses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders to block, track, or take over the 🕕 Tactic: Command and Control
ateral Movement	×	command an	d control channel, as the	ere potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions. <sup>[1]BDM</sup> ① Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
ollection	v	DGAs can tai	ke the form of apparently	yrandom or "gibberish" strings (ex: letgmxdejdxxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generating each
command and Control	^	letter. Alterna	atively, some DGAs emplo	oy whole words as the unit by concatenating words together instead of letters (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are Exabeam; Sykain Gil, Exabeam; Sykain Gil
Application Layer Protocol	×			main for each time period (hourly, daily, monthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to make predicting Varsion: 1.0
Communication Through Removable Media		future domai	ns more difficult for defer	nders. UK/HND Created: 10 March 2020
Data Encoding	×			prose of Fallback Channels. When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ Last Modified: 11 March 2022
Data Obfuscation	v	a DGA as a n	reans to reestablishing or	sommand and control. <sup>[4](0)7]</sup> Version Permalink
Dynamic Resolution	^			
Fast Flux DNS		Proced	dure Example	25
Domain Generation Algorithms		ID	Name	Description
DNS Calculation		G0096	APT41	APT41 has used DGAs to change their C2 servers monthly, <sup>[1]</sup>
Encrypted Channel	ř			
Fallback Channels		S0456	Aria-body	Aria-body has the ability to use a DGA for C2 communications. <sup>191</sup>
Ingress Tool Transfer		\$0373	Astaroth	Astaroth has used a DGA in C2 communications. <sup>[16]</sup>
Multi-Stage Channels		S0534	Bazar	Bazar can implement DCA using the current date as a seed variable. <sup>[11]</sup>
Non-Application Layer Protocol		00004	0020	
Non-Standard Port		\$0360	BONDUPDATER	BONDUPDATER uses a DGA to communicate with command and control servers. <sup>[172]</sup>
Protocol Tunneling Proxy	~	S0222	CCBkdr	CCBkdr can use a DGA for Fallback Channels if communications with the primary command and control server are lost. <sup>[4]</sup>
Remote Access Software		\$0023	CHOPSTICK	CHOPSTICK can use a DGA for Fallback Channels, domains are generated by concatenating words from lists. <sup>[7]</sup>
Traffic Signaling	~	00400	Confedera	Production of the second s
Web Service	~	\$0608	Conficker	Conficker has used a DGA that seeds with the current UTC victim system date to generate domains. <sup>[13][14]</sup>
xfiltration	~	S0673	DarkWatchman	DarkWatchman has used a DGA to generate a domain name for C2. <sup>[13]</sup>
npact	~	S0600	Doki	Doki has used the DynDNS service and a DGA based on the Dogecoin blockchain to generate C2 domains.[16]
sbile	~	\$0377	Ebury	Ebury has used a DGA to generate a domain name for C2.[17D14]
	~	Contrast of the		the second s

Figure 14: Mitre Frameworkunde Domain Generation Algorithms

It is given with **T1568.002** technique in DGA Mitre and procedure examples, mitigations detection method (Detection).



Domain generation algorithms (DGAs) allow attackers to manage websites to spread infections and command-and-control (C&C) facilities by changing domain names promptly.

One of the scenarios for using DGA can be observed when a computer system is infected with malware. Malware on a compromised machine attempts to connect to systems under the attacker's control to receive commands or send back collected information.

Attackers use DGA to calculate the order of domains that infected computers try to connect to. This is done to prevent control of the compromised infrastructure from being lost when the attacker's domains or IP addresses written directly into the code are blocked by security systems.

# **Example-4** PunyCode / Homoglyphic Attacks

A homoglyph attack is a deception technique that uses homoglyphs or homographs, in which an attacker abuses the similarity of character scripts to create **fake domains of existing brands to trick users into clicking**.

MITRE   ATT&CK				Matrices	Tactics •	Techniques +	Data Sources	Mitigations - Gro	oups S	Software	Resources -	Blog 🕑	Contribute	Search Q			
TECHNIQUES		Home > 1	Techniques > Enterpris	se > Acquire infrastructure > Domains													
Enterprise Reconnaissance	Ŷ	Acq	Acquire Infrastructure: Domains														
Resource Development	^	Other	sub-techniques	of Acquire Infrastructure (6)		¥ ID: T1583.001											
Acquire Infrastructure Domains	^	Adversaries may purchase domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP								Sub-technique of: T1583							
DNS Server		addresse	s. They can be purcha	ased or, in some cases, acquired for free.					Tactic: Resource Development								
Virtual Private Server				d domains for a variety of purposes, including for P similar to legitimate domains, including through us	Platforms: PRE     CAPEC ID: CAPEC-630												
Server				aid in delivery of payloads via Drive-by Compromis					Contributors: Deloitte Threat Library Team; Vinayak Wadhwa, Lucideus: Wes Hurd								
Botnet	- L	create vis	ually similar lookalike	e domains for use in operations. <sup>[4]</sup>						Version:							
Web Services		Domain re	egistrars each mainta	ain a publicly viewable database that displays conta	act informatio	n for every registe	red domain. Priva	te WHOIS services									
Compromise Accounts Compromise Infrastructure	č			, such as their own company data, rather than the o who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may fu			, ,		Last Modified: 16 October 2021								
Develop Capabilities	Ĵ			urchasing domains with different domain registrars		Centres to track to	neir inmastructure	e by using varied	Version Permalink								
Establish Accounts	Ĵ																
Obtain Capabilities	~	Proc	edure Exan	nples													
Stage Capabilities	~	ID .	Name	Description													
Initial Access	~	G0006	GC000         APT1         APT1 has registered hundreds of domains for use in operations. <sup>[3]</sup> GC007         APT28         registered domains initiating NAT0, OSCE security websites, Caucasus information resources, and other organic														
Execution	~																
Persistence	~	G0007									nizations. <sup>Laters</sup>						
Privilege Escalation	~	G0016	APT29	APT29 has acquired C2 domains, sometimes the	limes through resellers. <sup>[0][0]10]</sup>												
Defense Evasion	~	G0050	APT32	APT32 has set up and operated websites to gat!	her informatio	n and deliver malv	ware.[11]										
Credential Access	~	G0035	G0035 Dragonfly Dragonfly has registered domains for targeting intended victims. <sup>[12]</sup>														
Discovery	~																
Lateral Movement	č	60137	Ferocious Kitten	Ferocious Kitten has acquired domains imitating	g legitimate si	tes. <sup>[13]</sup>											
Collection Command and Control	č	G0046	FIN7	FIN7 has registered look-alike domains for use it	in phishing ca	mpaigns. <sup>[14]</sup>											
Exfiltration	Ĵ	G0047	Gamaredon	Gamaredon Group has registered multiple doma	ins to facilita	te payload staging	and C2.[15[16]										
Impact	~		Group														
Mobile	~	G0136	IndigoZebra	IndigoZebra has established domains, some of	which were de	signed to look like	e official governm	ent domains, for their op	erations. <sup>[†</sup>	17]							
ICS	~	G0094	Kimsuky	Kimsuky has registered domains to spoof target	ted organizati	ons and trusted th	ird parties.[18][19]2	24[[21]]22[[23]									
		00032	Lazania Group	Lazance Group has acquired domains related to													

Figure 15: Punycode / Homoglyph Attacks technique in MITRE



One of the most important components users can use to determine if a URL is part of a phishing attack is to compare the host and domain name to what is expected of a legitimate website. For example, an email asking users to enter their banking information on a website with the domain name attackeradgh.com will not receive as many entries as a website hosted under a more reasonable-looking name. There are many common techniques used today and in the past to make links look more reputable. One of them, for example, would be **to have the anchor text say something else, but point to something else:** 

<a href="http://attackeradghb.com">http://www.microsoft.com</a>

Another technique is to confuse users by changing the URL so that the actual hostname is in the last part:

http://www.microsoft.com@attackeradghb.com

Although some modern browsers give a warning, this can be circumvented by using Punycode and homoglyphic techniques.

Normally, DNS tags (parts separated by periods) should be contained only in the ASCII subset of letters, numbers, and a hyphen (sometimes called the LDH rule). In addition, a tag must not begin or end with a hyphen and is not case sensitive. This limited character set causes problems if someone wants to use a character in a DNS tag that is not part of the LDH set.


Punycode, or the International Domain Names in Applications (IDNA) framework used on the Internet, was developed to convert normally invalid characters in DNS hostnames into valid characters. In this way, domain and host names can be created using characters from a user's native language, but still, need to be translated into something the DNS system can use (assuming the application supports IDNA decoding). For example:

"https://kueche.de" (browsers that support the IDNA specification translate it to "https://xn--kche-0ra.de/". Not ASCII, for example, "HTTP:// 已从本地. 中國" (these changes to the domain http://xn--1lq90ic7fzpc.xn--fiqz9s).


The second aspect of this attack is homoglyphs. A homoglyph is a symbol that looks the same or very similar to another symbol. An example that most people are familiar with is the letter O and the number 0. Depending on the font used, it can be difficult to tell them apart. The letters I (lowercase L) and I (uppercase i) are other common examples.



It gets even more interesting when there are very similar characters from different languages in Unicode. Languages that use diacritical accents, letter-like symbols, and other usable homoglyphs, and characters that look like the regular Latin alphabet show up with great regularity, some of them appearing to be almost exact copies of the same symbol. A common example is the Cyrillic alphabet, with very similar homoglyphs for a, c, e, o, p, x, and y. Even the Latin alphabet appears twice in Unicode.



It is represented in both the 0021-007E (Basic Latin) and FF01-FF5E (Full-width Latin) ranges of Unicode. This means that switching from one encoding to the other for a given Latin character is as easy as adding 65248 decimal values to the subrange versions. Depending on the font used, mixing character families can result in a "ransom note"-like visual effect. Example:



While IDNA is used to enable internationalized DNS tags, it can also be used to make a URL or hostname look more legitimate than it actually is. The Unicode representation can cause visual confusion for a user or inspire confidence where it should not. Example:

http://www.microsoft.com/index.html.attackeradghb.com may look like a legitimate Microsoft URL, but on closer inspection, it leads to a website that the author controls.

This is because the third slash symbol is not a slash symbol. The actual DNS record looks like this: microsoft.xn--comindex-g03d.html. attackeradghb.com


Details, examples of Punycode / Homoglyph Attacks technique in MITRE and examples of groups using it are given.



### Two Important Components of the DNS Safety Concept

**1)** Ensuring the overall integrity and availability of DNS services that resolve hostnames on the network to IP addresses.

2) Monitoring DNS activity to detect potential security problems anywhere on your network.







MITRE ATT&CK is a powerful open source tool for understanding and classifying cyber attacker tactics, techniques, and procedures. MITRE has made it easy to improve cyber defence by providing a unified classification for classifying attackers and their behaviours in a consistent and easily communicated manner. Cyber defence teams can design a comprehensive strategy for security controls against potential threats and design tactics and techniques that attackers will display, assess risks, and then prioritize and address gaps in their cyber defences.

As DNSSense, we have explained DNS-specific usage in this whitepaper using the MITRE ATT&CK structure. We have focused on DNS analysis and Advanced DNS Visibility products for enterprise network needs. Today, we provide all the DNS analysis data that SOC teams need while ensuring that institutions are securely connected to the Internet with three integrated products.

Effectively monitoring DNS traffic on your network for suspicious anomalies is critical for the early detection of security breaches. With a tool like DNSSense Visibility, you'll be able to keep an eye on all the important metrics. With intelligent SIEM integration, you can set up alerts for a specific period or as a result of a combination of anomalous actions. DNSSense's artificial intelligence algorithms ensure over 99.5% classification. Based on this database, only the data that SOC teams need to review is sent to SIEM. This allows you to save over 95% of DNS log processing costs with intelligent SIEM integration.



### References

- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/
- https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework
- https://detect-respond.blogspot.com/
- https://www.iso.org/isoiec-27001-information-security.html
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitre\_Corporation
- http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3492.txt



🧿 338a Regents Park Road, Office 3 And 4, N3 2LN London, United Kingdom

+44 (0) 203 376 03 30

💿 info@dnssense.com

© 2022 The Secureend LTD. DNSSense is registered trademark of Secureend LTD. MITRE, CVE, MITRE ATT&CK, ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. All other trademarks, service marks and company names are properties of their respective owners. © 2022 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation.

